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This.publicAtion is one of a series of Korean Agricult~ralSector Study
 
Special Reports. Through the cooperation of the Republic of Korea, Michig.i
 
State University and USAID, an agricultural sector study, entitled Korean
 
Agricultural Sector Analysis and Recommended Development Strategies, 1971­
1985 was completed between September 1971 and July 1972. Concurrent with
 
and contributing to the sector study the rudimentary components of a com­
puterized simulation model were developed. This work continues with the
 
objective of developing and institutionalizing a fully operational agriculture
 
sector simulation model as a tool for use by Korean decision makers in
 
policy formulation and program development.
 
The KASS special reports are the result of the work of a number of
 
joint Korean and American task forces established to collect and analyze
 
data and develop working papers on a variety of specific topics for back­
ground and input and follow up to the sector analysis efforts. The reports
 
are joint publications of the Agricultural EconomicF Research Institute,
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Republic of Korea and the Department
 
of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan.
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION
 
The major purposes of this report are to provide a general descrip­
tion of the organization of the agricultural marketing system in Korea;
 
to identify trends and factors affecting the changing organization and
 
its requirements; to indicate current performance of the existing mar­
keting system; to identify barriers to improved preformance; and to sug­
gest possible improvements in the organization of the agricultural mar­
keting system.
 
Marketing has two closely related but different aspects. One aspect
 
is the physical transformations which take place in the distribution sys­
tem. Utility is created by transfering products from producers to con­
sumers, changing the form and condition of products, and transferring
 
products from one time period to another. The second aspect is the coor­
dination of economic activities of the system. Coordination of the system
 
takes three forms:
 
1. Interaction of buyers and sellers in the market, resulting in
 
prices which act as incentives and guides to producers and consumers;
 
2. Int.ernal or administrative coordination within firms and public
 
organizations, and
 
3. Administrative rules and regulations which determine what has
 
to be taken into account in economic decisions.
 
Both aspects of marketing are important in the transition from tradi­
tional agriculture to a scientific industrial economy. Fundamental to the
 
transition or development process, are the interrelationships of production
 
and distribution of consumer goods, capital goods, and scientific and
 
technical knowledge. The production and distribution of capital goods
 
and technical knowledge need investment (deferred consumption or stored
 
labor) as well as specialization. The investment in scientific-technical
 
knowledge and the capital goods in which the knowledge is embedded, pro­
duce new technologies and greater potential for a more productive economy.
 
The transition, thus, involves more specialized, more round-about and more
 
complex production-distribution systems; coordination becomes more critical
 
to the performance of the system. While costs of distribution become a
 
large and critical component of the economy.
 
The production-distribution system for any food consists of a series
 
of coordinated transformations including the production of farm inputs,
 
farming, assembly, conditioning and processing, storage, transporting,
 
wholesaling, and retailing. Related functions include credit, insurance,
 
communications, and regulations. As the transformation progresses, a
 
larger percentage of activities in the system takes place off farms in
 
the production of technical inputs, processing, and distribution. Uiso
 
important to the transition from traditional agriculture are distribution
 
of consumer goods to rural areas and transfer of labor to more productive
 
activities.
 
This report while concerned primarily with farm product marketing
 
and with lesser consideration of the delivery system for technical farm
 
inputs, will attempt to consider these activities within the context of
 
the coordinated agricultural system in the process of development.
 
The transition from traditional agriculture to a scientific indus­
.,trialeconomy can stagnate at any level of development, leaving large num­
bers of people in very low productivity employment and very low levels of
 
'
 
consumption. Achieving the productivity gain potentially available from an
 
industrialized system requires a continuous search for methods 
of improving
 
Incentives must be struc­performance of the various elements of the economy. 

tured to encourage the identification and exploitation of the changing econ­
omic opportunities. But barriers to improved performance develop within the
 
system. Performance failures of the agricultural marketing system in coor­
dination and physical distribution can retard the transition from a tradi­
tional to a high-productivity economy. Uncertain and unrewarding farm pro­
ducts and inputs, and high prices and uncertain supplies of food to urban
 
consumers all encourage the maintenance of low-productivity subsistence
 
farming.
 
System performance is conceived as a flow of consequences from a par-­
ticular organization of the system, including both the structure of the
 
system and the rules of behavior regulating the participants of the system.
 
Performance is improved when a change in organization produces a more de­
sirable flow of consequences.
 
In a broader context, performance can be judged only in terms of a
 
set of goals or objectives. Changes in organization of an agricultural,
 
marketing system can contribute to effective achievement of the following
 
eight goals:
 
1. To assure an abundant and reliable supply of food at econ(mical
 
prices, by stimulating the production and distribution of the quanti­
ties and varieties of food which will result in more nutritionally
 
adequate diets
 
2. To facilitate and promote the production and distribution of com­
binations of foods and related services which best reflect preferences
 
and needs of consumers and real relative c-asts of production
 
3. To create incentives for increased productivity in, each activity 
of the total system of food production and distribution, by providing 
farmers with reliable markets, reducing uncertainty, stimulating pro­
duction, and creating incentives to produce those commodities demanded 
by consumers 
4. To achieve a fair and equitable exchange system, insuring that
 
the consequences of government policieb and programs are fair and
 
equitable
 
5. To stimulate development of opportunities for productive and re­
warding employment, and a productive labor force
 
6. 	To discourage uneconomic use and spoilation of natural resources
 
/
in the environmentil

7. To encourage socially desirable population settlement patterns2/
 
8. To encourage a sense of belonging and personal effectiveness
 
among participants in the system.
 
I/The rules and regulations determining what has to be taken into account
 
by individuals in economic activity are critical in achieving the objective.
 
2/Many aspects of marketing and marketing programs influence settlement pat­
terns; location of marketing facilities is an example.
 
Chapter 2 
TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURE AND THE 
TURE DEMAND FOR MARKETING SERVICES 
Since 1969 more than half of the Korean labor force has been employed
 
ouiside of farming, forestry, and fishing. More than half of the agricul­
tural production, roughly, has been marketed since about 1969. The percent
 
age of farm production which enters commercial channels varies considerably
 
by commodity. Table II-1 estimates the ratio of marketed supplies to farm
 
production for 12 major commodities. The data do not provide a very pre­
cise estimate of commercial marketings. The amount entering commercial
 
marketing channels is between the estimates of ratio marketed in the nar­
row and broad sense as presented in the Table. What is not known is the
 
percentage of the commodities paid in kind for wages, rents, and donations
 
which enter the commercial market, but a large portion of the food grains
 
probably is exchanged for rent or credit owed, to be marketed in turn
 
by the landlord or lender. Hired farm workers most likely sell a large
 
portion of the rice they receive as wages while consuming most of the
 
barley received. Thus, a reasonable estimate of the portion of marketed
 
output for rice would be more than 65 percent and for barley less than
 
30 percent for 1970. The differences between marketings in the narrow
 
and broad senses are much less for the other commodities; the marketings
 
in the narrow sense probably come close to the amounts actually entering
 
marketing channels.
 
Based upon farm consumption and gross receipts estimates, it can
 
be assumed that almost all of the production of meat, milk, fruits, and
 
Table TI-i: Ratio of Marlv'tLcd Supply for Sele'ted Commodities 
Marketed Sujpl 
_In Narrow Sense B/AxlOO C/AxlO0 
Wage Subsidy in in(A) Market Taxes & Milling SLub- payment & (C) narrow broadCommodity Production sales1/ chas / charges Total(B) in kind donation Rent Total sense sense 
Rice 69 1,861.40 755.60 
 37.45 58.92 851.97 
 68.16 70.78 392.42 1,340.33 45.77 72.01
70 2,081.65 895.59 
 56.08 61.16 1,012.83 
 77.61 77.23 368.09 1,535.76 48.66 73.78
 
Glutinous 69 36.19 
 16.74 0.01 
 1.31 18.06 0.36 
 1.90 2.05 22.37 49.49 61.30
rice 70 49.56 20.46 

- 1.72 22.18 0.18 1.47 
 1.59 25.42 44.75 51.29
 
Barley 69 792.47 
 156.43 4.31 21.81 
 182.55 19.36 10.31 
 56.83 269.05 23.04 33.95
 
70 761.95 159.60 4.54 
 20.54 184.68 17.85 
 13.29 63.05 278.87 24.24 36.60
 
Wheat 69 158.83 36.07 0.10 3.58 
 39.75 3.36 
 2.65 8.24 54.00 25.03 34.00

70 186.46 34.40 0.18 
 4.07 38.65 2.78 1.89 11.93 55.25 20.73 29.63
 
Millet 69 47.55 7.85 
 0.05 1.36 9.26 
 0.79 0.72 1.82 
 12.59 19.47 26.48
70 29.05 4.54 0.00 0.99 5.53 0.64 0.24 1.34 7.75 19.04 26.68 
Sorghum 69 6.97 0.91 
- 0.12 1.03 0.10 0.12 
 0.73 1.98 14.78 28.41
70 5.83 2.09 
- 0.08 2.17 0.07 
 0.07 0.08 2.39 37.22 41.00
 
Corn 69
 
Corn 69 69 57.03 27.82 
 0.25 
- 28.07 0.34 0.06 2.92 31.39 49.22 55.04
70 33.44 23.59 
 0.21 
- 23.80 0.16 0.02 4.01 
 27.99 71.17 83.70
 
Soybean 69 131.37 65.97 0.09 
­ 66.06 1.53 1.55 6.52 
 75.66 50.29 57.59
70 102.99 56.17 0.10 
­ 56.27 0.66 1.89 
 5.03 63.85 54.64 62.00
 
Red bean 69 23.47 10.23 
­ - 10.23 0.67 0.43 0.78 12.11 43.59 51.60
70 16.45 11.60 

- - 11.60 0.09 0.34 0.41 12.44 70.52 75.62
 
Green 69 2.80 
 1.65 0.00 
­ 1.65 0.02 0.12 
 0.20 1.99 58.93 71.07
bean 70 2.44 1.86 

-
- 1.86 0.01 0.08 0.10 
 2.05 76.23 84.02
 
Sweet 69 438.95 132.01 0.04 

- 132.05 1.55 
 6.24 19.61 159.45 30.08 36.33
potatoes 70 396.81 118.16 

-
- 118.16 
 1.47 5.77 14.62 ]40.02 29.78 35.29
 
Wh! te 69 178.85 39.00 

- - 39.00 0.96 2.27 3.69 45.91 21.81 25.67 
/ttos70 177.87 47.74 0.10 
­ 47.84 0.84 1.96I/Incude barter as well as 4.07 54.71 26.90 30.76
cash exchange 2/Payments in kind for local tax, national tax, and other public cbargt3/i'avnmolts in kind for rent on land, farm machineries, draft animals and repayments with interest for borrowed grains4 /Potatoes are measured in kilograms. Source: NACF Monthly Review 12, 1971, p. 34­
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industrial crops are marketed while less than half of the vegetables pro­
duced appear to'be marketed.
 
The most significant factor in the expanding need for marketing ser­
vices and facilities is illustrated by the projected population and employ­
ment statistics. The population is projected to increase from 31,624,214
 
.in 1970 to about 39,300,000 in 1985, an increase of approximately 28 per­
cent. In contrast, the non-farm work force'is projected to increase from
 
a.bout 4,834,000 and in 1970 to about 11,700,000 in 1985, a 244 percent
 
increase. To provide food at current levels of per-capita consumpticn,
 
farm production would increase by 28 percent while food marketed would in­
crease by about 240 percent, assuming that the current food consumed by
 
farm families is self-supplied and not marketed. But farm families do pur­
chase food and other food marketing services such as grain milling, and re­
quired expansion in marketing services would vary by type of service and
 
commodity.
 
The population and employment projections indicate the magnitude of
 
the requised expansion in the overall system of food marketing. Since rice
 
is dominantx and rice milling would increase only by the percentage of in­
creased total consumption, &ad since the percentage of rice marketed ex­
ceeds the percentage of the rural population, the, 240 percent projection
 
overestimates the aggregate effect of the popula'.:ion transition. Neverthe­
less, it remains a fairly reliable indicator of the minimum increase needed
 
in urban-related food market-.ng services and facilities.
 
Changing incomes, preferences, and technologies also will influence
 
requirements for specific types of marketing services and relative cost
 
and importance of marketing and distribution. Quantitative analysis has
 
not been attempted, but aow observations concerning the relevant factors
 
may be useful in future analysis leading to projection of needed services
 
and facilities.
 
Since many advantages accrue from more specialized farm production
 
and expanded farm incomes will increase the demand for a more'varied diet,
 
especially for meats and fruits which are now farm self-sufficiency foods,
 
the demand for marketing services to serve farm family consumption needs
 
will greatly expand.
 
The general shift in the relative composition of diets from grains to
 
non-grains also will greatly affect the relationship of the marketing bill
 
to total food costs. The costs of marketing grain, relative to the retail
 
price of grain are very low, amouniting to only 15 to 20 percent, not in­
cluding interest charges on storage. In contrast, the marketing costs of
 
non-processed fruits and vegetables appears to be about 50 percent and
 
for processed 75 percent would not be an unrealistic expectation.l/
 
The demand for processing and convenient retailing also will be in­
creased by changes in life styles and employment patterns. As more women
 
enter the work force and the opportunity costs of domestic services increas
 
the demand for improved grading, sanitation, and processing, and for con­
venience in shopping will increase.
 
An offsetting factor in marketing costs will be a reduction in mar­
keting costs associated with increased output per worker. Very substantial
 
economics of scale can exist in providing many of the services and currentl
 
scale is very small. The assembly, wholesaling, and retail functions re­
quired in 1985 should be possible using fewer workers than are currently
 
employed in these activities. The net effect, however, will depend upon
 
1/In the U.S. more than 60 percent of the retail value of food is accounted
 
for by costs between the farmer and the consumer.
 
-9­
ts
and overall willingness to adopt improvemewhat happens."'to wage rates, 
Sin the- f!)od .distribution system. 
Chapter 3
 
SELECTED COMMODITIES IN THE MARKETING SYSTEM
 
Introduction
 
Commodities in the Korean agricultural marketing system aiscussea in
 
this chapter include grains, soybeans and other pulses, potatoes, three
 
varieties of fruit, vegetables, livestock and related products and other
 
products.
 
Grains
 
Food grains, especially rice, dominate both Korean agriculture and
 
consumption. The performance cf the marketing system in grainIs is closely
 
related to the Government's grain management program designed to stabilize 
prices and reduce the spread between farm and retail prices.
 
The farm price for rice and barley are typically quoted on a polished
 
or milled basis. The farm-retail price spreads, using average annual prices
 
in 1970 expressed as a percent of retail prices were:
 
Grain Percent
 
Rice 4.8 
Barley 11.4 
Wheat 17.7 
Corn 16.2 
IEstimates of the price spreads, however, are very misleading for four
 
.... n :s 
1. The retail price used in the calculation is the official controlled
 
price. A sLustantial portion of the grain, especially rice, is sold
 
a t prices above the official price; the quantity and price in this.
 
market are unknown.
 
2. 	 The govrnment.grain management program releases grain, including 
at prices below the market price, subsidizing consump­imported rice, 
tion.
 
3. The governmentbuying price for rice from farmers generally-has
 
been significantly below the farm price.
 
4. The price spread does not reflect typical quality and quantity
 
margins in the trading practices in grains.
 
The quantity margin represents the gain in the quantity sold over the
 
quantity purchased, and results from the use of slightly variable quantity
 
measures rather than exact weights in trading. The quality margin repre­
sents the increased value of grain purchased resulting from shifts from a
 
lower grade to a higher one. One study reports quality margins at a par­
ticular point in time for rice of about 2 percent and quantity margins for
 
bulk sales of about 5 percent.
 
Figure 111-1 shows typical marketing channels for rice. The channels
 
for barley, wheat and corn are similar. Except for the grain handled as
 
government entrusted business--that purchased under the grain management
 
program, including primarily payments of loans and taxes in kind and im­
ports, which move through National Agricultural Cooperative Federation
 
(NACF) and cooperative channels--almost all grain moves through private
 
channels. The 	cooperative system has not been competitive in marketing
 
grain. Reasons for this seem to include strict application of grading
 
standards by NACF, inability to take advantage of quaittity and quality
 
margins, necessity of selling at legal prices, and ties between farmers
 
and collectors involving credit arrangements and the relative convenience
 
of the private merchant outlet. Thus a combination of policies requiring
 
the repayment of credit purchases of inputs to be paid in kind, price
 
65% 
(80%) 
Collecting 
Merchants 
of Brokers 
Rice 
Mills 
Shippers 
Brokers 
Whole 
ConsigmentRetailers.salers 
Rt e 
- -------- -------
--- - - - --
S Broker 
Wholesalers 
Government15% Entrusted(33%) Producers Marketing 
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\\ 
Source: NACF 
Date: April, 1968 
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I 
, ! 
Government Designated 
Rice Mills 
. 
Designated 
Wholesalers Retailers 
---
Consumers 
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controls, and the application of perhaps unrealistic (at leat3t uncomper-i­
tive) grading standards all reduce the potential effectiveness of the cooper­
ative to improve coordination and reduce distribution cost for the grain
 
system.
 
Tables III-1 through 111-4 give the price margins at a particular point
 
Note these data do not include the costs of storage, adjust for
in time. 

or quantity margins, and represent only prices
Any possible gain from quality 

in the legal market. Also note that the data represent the cost from a par­
ticular point.
 
Table III-1: 	 Estimated Marketing Margins for Rice through Merchant Channel
 
(Youngsanpo-Seoul), November 9, 1968
 
Margins
 
Selling Marketing Total
 
prices costs Margins Value Rate
Classification 

-
-
-4,742 -Producer 

50 6.6
Collector 4,792 14 36 

458 60.5
Shipper 5,250 351 107 

25 50 6.6
25
Wholesaler 5,300 

100 200 26.3
100
Retailer 5,500 

490 268 758 100.0
Total 	 -

Source: 	 Rice Marketing, NACF. The rate of price spread to retail price
 
(758/5,500) is 10.4 percent. Unit is 80 kg per bag.
 
Table 111-2: 	 Marketing Costs and Margins for Barley, 1970
 
Selling Total
 
Classification price margins Rate
 
(W0
 
Shipper 	 3,125 -

Wholesaler 	 3,258 133 31.1
 
Retailer 	 3,552 294 68.9
 
Total 	 - 427 100.0
 
Source: NACF
 
Note: 1. Above is the pricing-margin. Unit is won per 76.5 kg (bag)
 
2. Rate of margin (427/3,552) is 12.0
 
Table 111-3: 	 Marketing Costs and Margins by Function for Corn (Chunchon-

Seoul), December 1968
 
Selling Marketing Margins
 
Classification price Costs Net margins Total Rate
 
--Producer 	 1,550 - -
Circulating
 
collector 1,730 150 30 180 40.9
 
Collector in
 
producing area 1,870- 90 50 140 31.8
 
Wholesaler 1,990 40 80 120 ,27.3
 
Purchasing price 
by processor 1,990 - . - -
Total 	 - 280 160' 440, 100.0 
Source: NACF
 
Note: Rate of marketing margins is 22.11 percert (from farmer to proces.
 
sor). Unit is won per 72 kg (bag).
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Table 111-4: Marketing Costs and Margins for Wheat Flour, 1970
 
Classification Selling prices Total margins Rate
 
(Z) 
Shipper 764 
Wholesaler 786 2236.1 
Retailer 825 39 63.9 
Total 
 61 100..0
 
Source: NACF
 
Note: Rate of marketing margins (61/825) is 7.4 percent. Unit is won
 
per 22 kg (bag)
 
Grain is, of course, the least expensive food to market. It should
 
be marketed at a low cost. These data indicate no great potential savings
 
are available from improved physical distribution of grain, excluding
 
the storage function if these data approximate reality. The exception
 
appears to be corn; it would seem that costs could be significantly reduced
 
in moving corn from farmers to processors.
 
Table 111-5: Geographic Difference in Average Monthly Wholesale Prices,
 
1970, for the 4 Grains in 1970
 
Rice
 
Month
 
City 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 12
 
Seoul 5,796 5,826 5,827 5,892 5,902 6,029 6,191 6,132 6,401 6,390 7,042 6,987
 
Pusan 5,579 5,714 5,750 5,745 5,702 5,700 5,700 5,700 5,700 6,079 6,654 6,916
 
Taegu 5,704 5,800 5,800 5,754 5,800 5,800 5,800 5,922 6,460 6,267 6,555 6,879 E
 
T'wangju 5,290 5,416 5,400 5,543 5,650 5,659 5,700 5,787 5,929 6,008 6,570 6,391 f
 
Taejon 5,536 5,649 5,654 5,793 5,944 5,967 6,108i6,069 6,290 6,193 6,614 6,663 (
 
Average [5,58115,6825,681 5,7465,8005.,83115,90015,9226,156 6,1876,687 6,7671f
 
Note: Unit is won per 80 kg (bag) (C
 
Table 111-5: (cont.)
 
Barley
 
Month
 
City 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Average
 
Seoul 3,200 3,200 3,233 3,358 3,379 3,343 3,339 3,482 3,558 3,526 3,692 3,966 3,440
 
Pusan 3,1803,1523,1673,197 3,26l 3,25213,253 3,237 3,245 ,4333 3,740 3,312
 
Taegu 3,100 3,100 3,1003,100i3,203,3,294:3,236 i3,274 !3,300 3,430 3,5073,689 3,276
 
Kwangju 2,48312,670 2,66312,80712,752:2,750:2,800 2,935 13,150 3,120 ?3,1973s6001
2,911
 
Taejon 3,1003,100 3,1003,22713,374i3,37813,402 34023,4503,492 3587 3,645 3,352
 
Average 3,013 3,04413,053i3,138j3,94 2 3,195 13,266 3,341 3,40013,5223,7283,258 
Note: Unit is won per 76.5 kg (bag)
 
Corn 
Month 
City 112 3 415 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Average 
Seoul 2,032 2,254 2,300 2,350 2,4002,530!3,000 3,000 3,000 2,919 2,800 2,954 2,620
 
Pusan 2,450 2,430 2,356 2,607 2,459 2,492 2,566 2,651 2,884 2,836 2,704 2,800 2,603
 
Taegu 2,257!2,300 2,341 .2,40012,477 2,489 2,509 2,658 12,750 2,699 2,740 2,750 2,531
 
Kwangju 2,736 2,646 2,523 2,527 2,519 2,500 ;2,611 2,500 2,584 2,680 2,700 2,700 2,602
 
Taejon 2,092'2,108 2,06312,194 2,255 2,400!2,466 2,336 !2,067 2,50812,500 2,500 2,291 
439 2 48 Average 2,313,2,34712,316 2,416j2 , 12,630 2,629 12,658 2,729 12,68912,741 2,532 
Note: Above price is average wholesaler's price of five major cities in Korea; unit is 
won per 75 kg (bag). 
Wheat 
I Month 
City 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12Average 
Seoul - - - 2,410 2,426 2,282 2,324 2,408 2,525 2,628 2,580 2,456 2,449 
Pusan - - 2,459 2,419 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,540 2,500 2,584 2,600 2,477 
Taegu - I - 2,389 2,400 2,402 2,424 2,400 2,417 2,500 2,500 2,534 2,441 
Kwangju - - - 2,120 2,264 2,350 2,333 2,235 2,212 2,221 2,452 2,550 2,304 
Taejon - 2,415 2,556 2,650 2,383 2,344 2,499 2,492 2,467 2,500 2,478 
Average 2,360 2,413 2,4-17 2 37, 2,357 2,438 2,468i2,516 2,528 24 
Source: NACF Note: 	 Above price Is average wholesaler's price of five major citie
 
in Korea. Unit is won per 60 kg (bag).
 
Samples of day-to-day fluctuations in prices of the four grains are
 
shown in Table 111-6 with averages of reported wholesale prices for the
 
five largest cities.
 
Table 111-6: Average Wholesale Prices in 5 Major Cities, 1971 for four
 
grains on consecutive days.
 
Grain
 
Day Rice Barley 

Oct. 1-15 Dec.. 1-15 

1 7,800 4,660 

2 7,820 4,680 

3 7,820 4,680 

4 7,820 4,680 

5 8,100 4,680 

6 8,100 4,680 

7 8,140 4,660 

8 8,250 4,660 

9 8,460 4,660 

10 8,510 4,660 

11 8,540 4,680 

12. 8,790 4,680 

13 8,830 4,700 

14 8,800 4,720 

15 8,780 4,720 

16 

Average 8,288 4,680 

Source: NACF
 
Corn Wheat
 
Sept. 15-30 Dec. 1-15
 
2,600 2,530
 
2,600 2,534
 
2,600 2,534
 
2,620 2,534
 
2,620 2,534
 
2,620 2,536
 
2,620 2,534
 
2,620 2,536
 
2,620 2,536
 
2,640 2,536
 
2,620 2,536
 
2,650 2,546
 
2,650 2,546
 
2,650 2,546
 
2,650 2,546
 
2,660
 
2,628 2,537
 
Notes: Above price is average wholesaler's pri.-e of five major cities in
 
Korea. Rate of rising price for rice its 1.2 percent, uuit is won
 
per 80 kg (bag); for barley, 0.1 percen:, unit is won per 76.5 kg
 
(bag); for corn, 0.15 percent, unit is wion per 75 kg (bag); for
 
wheat, 0.05 percent, unit is won per 60 kg (bag).
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Table 111-7 shows estimates of seasonal price changes for the four
 
grains.•These are price indexes of reported wholesale price through th
 
legitimate market.
 
Table 111-7: Seasonal Price Changes for 4 Grains,
 
Rice
 
Month Rate of 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 12 .fluctuationIMI 
 (%) 
1966 88.6 90.2 90.4 93.8 98.9 100.4 102.4 110.6 121.4 110.8 95.0 92.8 32.8 
1967 85.3 88.0 88.9 101.6 107.0 109.4 110.1 108.8 106.8 100.4 97.8 96.0 24.1 
1968 86.6 93.0 92.1 93.2 97.6 98.4 101.0 102.9hO2.7 111.4 112.8 108.31 26.2 
1969 100.5 96.5 96.7 96.6 97.61 99.2 99.8 100.0100.0 100.6104.5 107.3 10.8 
1970 93.1 94.8' 94.81 95.8 96.71 97.3 98.4 98.81102.7 103.21111.5 112.91 19.8 
Ave. 90.8 92.5 i 92.61 96.2 99.61100.91102.3i104.21106.71105.3 104.3 103.51 15.9 
Source: NACF 
Barley 
Month Rate of 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 I ii 12 fluctuation1 0921i. (%) 
1966 99.8 107.1 107.9 105.6 102.7 90.2 82.3 85.0 92.7 102.61112.2 111.1 29.9
 
1967 98.2 99 5 103.3 115.3 109.51 92.6 90.5 91.3 95.4 98.4 102.2 107.9 24.8
 
1968 100.9 104.0 102.7 96.2 94.0 92.41 93.1 98.2 93.7 97.6 110.9 114.6 22.2 
1969 105.4 107.2 99.2 96.8 96.9 96.21 93.8 95.9 97.5 100.4 104.7 105.3 134 
1970 92.5 93.4 93.7 96.3 98.0i 98.31 98.1 100.2 102.5 104.4 108.1 114.4 21.9 
Ave. 99.0 101.7 100.7 100.8 99.81 94.31 92.3j 94.8 96.8 100.7 107.5 110.71 18.4 
Corn (1970) 
Month Rate of 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1i0 11 12 fluctuation 
Price I10I 
. 
Index 90.2Numbez ___ 93.5 _____ 92.2 96.4 97.7 !99.5 103.5 104.5 104.9 107.4 103.9 104.3 17.2 
Nource: 
NAC
 
(cont.)
 
Table 111-7: (cont.)
 
Wheat (1970) 
 ____th.____,, 
'_Month':.. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 819 111 12 Average 
Index 99.8 99.9 101.6 99.7 96.2 95.5 95.1 95.1 96.2 101.7 106.6 112.2 100
Number 
Source: The Bank of Korea
 
Notes: 	 Average prices of the years is 100.
 
There is no data on corn before 1970.
 
Above is average wholesaler's price index number for barley in five major cities.
 
Even based upon the officially reported prices, which could be expected
 
to under-estimate price differences, the geographic price differences are
 
great enough to suggest that performance of the market in allocating grain
 
geographically could be improved. In contrast the data indicate only small
 
day-to-day variations indicating well organized (or regular) markets within
 
a city market. The e'xception in the data is rice, which represents a seasonal
 
price increase near the end of the rice year.
 
Seasonal Prices
 
The seasonal price of grain, especially rice, represents both a major
 
policy issue and a market coordivation problem. It is roughly estimated that,
 
given the prevailing interest ratei and other costs, minimum storage costs
 
would be 3 percent per month, assuming an interest rate of about 24 percent
 
per year. Merchants appear to pay and lend at rates significantly above
 
24 percent and the government apparently can borrow at rates somewhat below
 
24 percent.
 
The seasonal price data indicate that it would usually be both very
 
unprofitable to store grain privately, and risky to store grain, due to the
 
uncertain seasonal price patterns. Since government storage represents less
 
than one-third of marketed rice (as reported) a large amount of rice must be
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stored privately. The price control and grain management program together
 
attempt to maintain seasonal price increases below the cost of storage. rhe
 
probable effects of these policies and programs is to force a significant
 
portion of grain outside of the legal and organized markets, thus increasing
 
the real costs of marketing grains and reducing the effectiveness of the mar­
ketin allocating grains through time and space. The grain management pro­
gram, as it was operated in 1969 and 1970, probably had the effect of both
 
reducing prices to farmers at harvest time and increasing the uncertainty of
 
prices at the farm level; and probably has resulted in lower real retail
 
prices, especially as a result of importing rice and selling rice to retailer
 
at below free-market prices.
 
By attempting to reduce the seasonal price increase, the'program has
 
made storage for the legal market unprofitable for the private merchani
 
and reduced the demand for grain at harvest time, depressing the harvest
 
price. At the same time, because of the government intervention, the normal
 
price increases cannot be anticipated and storage becomes more risky.
 
Added risk results under the anti-hoarding and speculation law, and the
 
necessity of selling outside legitimate channels to make a profit at stor­
age. The result to be expected is higher real stnrage costs.
 
Because it is less profitable and more risky to store grain, storage
 
by farmers, retailers and consumers also is discouraged. This constraint
 
reduces the availability of a considerable amount of relatively inexpensive
 
storage space, creates need for more commercial storage, and an apparent
 
shortage of storage space in the early part of each crop year.
 
Modifications
 
Modification in the government grain management program appears to
 
offer the most important potential improvement :n the coordination system
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for grains. The concept of government participation in stabilizing grain 
prices and reducing uncertainty is a good one, but modest modifications in
 
the program would seem to promise improved performance. First, a seasonal
 
price rise for grain reflecting the real costs of storage is both desirable
 
and legitimate. A government-managed buffer stock of domestically pur­
chased and imported grain can provide desirable stability in supplies and
 
prices; however, release of the grain from the buffer stock should be timed
 
to allow a regular and predictable seasonal advance in prices, with the
 
increase related to the real costs of storage. Since the cost of storage
 
is closely related to the interest rate of funds available for financing
 
storage, the credit policy on such loans could be used to influence the
 
seasonal price rise and the level of retail grain prices. Speculative
 
hoarding of grain would be discouraged by announcing and carrying out a 
policy of releasing buffer stocks, including imported grain, anytime the 
price for a particular month exceeded the programmed seasonal price in­
crease. The average annual of grain prices could be set at any desired
 
level above the world market price by adjusting the quantity of imported
 
grain.
 
Both farm production and efficient storage could be encouraged by an­
nouncing both the allowable seasonal price increase and the harvest price
 
of grain prior to planting. Given the existing level of grain imports, such 
a program should be relatively easily managed. The buffer stock program
 
could be supplemented by a program of non-recourse loans to farmers based
 
upon the announced price of grain, so that a farmer by placing the grain in
 
approved storage, would be able to borrow the value of his grain at the an­
nounced price; if the price of grain dropped below the announced level, he
 
could settle the loan by allowing the ownership of the grain to revert to
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the government.
 
The current government procedure of buying domestic grain is unneces­
sarily complicated and costly. Figure 111-2 outlines the procedure. The
 
simplest and least expensive procedure, in terms of the cost to the system,
 
would be to purchase the grain in the market in the same manner as a mer­
chat buys it for storage.
 
Other problems and possible contributiLns to improved performance exist.
 
The problem of straining facilities and depressing prices at harvest time
 
could be relieved by improving the availability and timing of repayment of
 
production credit to farmers. Development of commercial or cooperative
 
storage, with warehouse receipts which could be used as collateral for loans
 
at reasonable rates also would reduce the pressure on farmers to sell at
 
harvest, reduce their dependence on merchants for credit, and reduce marketing
 
ties to lenders.
 
Other Recommendations
 
Grades, standards and practices related to weights and measures could
 
be improved. Korea has a refined code on grades and standards but appar­
ently it is not used in ordinary trade because it does not reflect the needs
 
of those engaged in trade. The code could better coordinate the system if
 
it were simplified and designed to reflect those characteristics considered
 
important in trading by market channel participants from the farmer to the
 
consumer. A problem seems to be associated with the use of the straw bag,
 
which is apparently difficult to standardize, as the unit of measure in
 
trading. The straw bag also may result in unnecessary losses in shipping
 
and handling. Apparently inspection procedures lack uniformity and are un­
realistic in the view of farmers and traders; thus the procedures and ser­
vice have lost credibility with farmers. The inspection fee also may be
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be excessive for small lots relative to small farmers' ability to pay. 
The cooperative system has been discredited with the farmers through
 
its being used to implement government programs which farmers perceive as
 
against their interests, and its effectiveness as a competitive force in
 
the system has thereby been reduced. the credit program for inputs requir­
ing repayment in grain at below market prices is an example of such ques­
tionable use. The cooperative system should be examined and modified to be
 
come more responsive to the needs of farmers, and provide an efficient and
 
viable marketing alternative in a competitive market.
 
The sharply rising consumption of wheat flour (consumption in 1970 was
 
twice that in 1967) suggests the possibility of inadequate wheat processin8
 
facilities in the near future and the advisability of a feasibility study.
 
There also may be a need for improved and expanded facilities for processin
 
corn. The potential of developing and introducing the new high protein (hi
 
lycine) corn varieties as a means of improving nutrition should also be in­
vestigated; for example, an infant food of high nutritive content can be
 
formulated from the high lycine corn.
 
Soybeans and Other Pulses
 
Table 111-8 shows the reported average annual farm ltvel prices for
 
pulses. The data are presented to show the variability and uncertainty in
 
prices of the commodities. Only soybeans was given further consideration
 
for this report.
 
Tables 111-9 through 111-12 show seasonal, geographic and day-to-day
 
price differences, and estimate marketing costs for unprocessed soybeans
 
from farmer to retailer at a particular time and place.
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Table 111-8: Average Lnnual Prices Received by Farmers
 
Soybeans Red beans Green beans Peanuts Kidney beans Garden peas

Year Yellow Red Dried Hulled Dried Dried
 
Grade B. Grade B. Grade B. Grade B. Grade B. Grade B.
 
1965 3,254 4,082 4,684 7,704 2,523 i 3,062
 
1966 3,699 3,445 4,460 10,048 2,562 3,128
 
1967 4,863 4,480 b,269 10,305 3,073 2,864
 
1968 3,402 5,014 7,377 10,042 3,403 3,449
 
1969 3,709 4,027 5,646 12,638 2,837 2,484
 
1970 5,847 7,275 11,335 15,046 4,098 4,275
 
Note: Unit is won per 75 kg (bag)
 
Table 111-9: Marketing Costs and Margins for Soybeans (Chunchon-Seoul),
 
August 1969
 
Selling Total margins
 
Classification prices Costs Net margins Total Rate
 
() 
Producer 3,900 - - - -
Circulating collector 4,070 30 30.1
140 170 

Collector in producing
 
area 4,180 75 35 110 19.8
 
Wholesaler in consumption
 
area 4,280 15 85 100 17.9
 
Retailer 4,460 45 
 135 180 32.2 
Total 
- 285 100.0275 560 

Source: NACF
 
Note: Rate of marketing margins is 12.55 percent. Unit is won per 75 kg (bag).
 
About 23.6 percent of the marketed soybeans are processed commercially,
 
and many of the processors are small. Small scale at all points in the channel
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xrom zarmer to retai-er results in a complicated channel, sincemany different
 
individuals handle small quantities of the beans both before and after
 
p rocessing. 
The price data indicate not only uncertainty in annual prices but also
 
considerable variation in the pattern of seasonal prices which would make
 
storage risky. The geographic price pattern shows some difference greater
 
than could be explained by transportation cost. Figure 111-3 shows soybean
 
market 	channels.
 
Table 	II-10: Price Variation, Seasonal Price for Soybeans
 
Month 
 Rate of

Year, 	 1 2 3 1 4 5 ~6 7 18 19 10 11 12 fluctuation 
1966 78.2 87.8 89.3 91.6 	 100.3.101.2114.9 108.7 103.6 112.9 36.7
19671101.1 111.8112.8 j121.8 122.3 103.4 97.0 90.81 93.5 83.8 85.3 76.1 46.2. 
19681106.5 106.9 99.6 95.1 95.3 95.6 98.7 99.7 103.9 102.2 102.81 93.5 13.4 
77.2 8 1. 88.76 
19701 89.9 99.1,100.31 97.1 97.2 99.5 101.4 105.6 1i-5.61 97.0 97.8 99.1 25.7 
Ave. 90.6 97.3 96.8 97.2 99.7 97.7 1103.3 104.0,02.51 20.3 
Source: NACF
 
Note: 	 Above is average wholesaler's price index number in five major cities. Unit
 
is won per 75 kg (bag).
 
Table III-11: Day-to-Day Price Variation in Soybeans, September 1-15, 1971
 
Date
 
Sep.1 Sep.2 Sep.3 Sep.4 Sep.5 Sep.6 Sep.7 
 Sep.8
 
Price 6,360 6,420 6,420 6,420 6,460 6,460 6,480 6540
 
Date
 
Pie 	 Sep.9 Sep.10 {Sep.11 Sep.12 Sep.13 Sep.14 Sep.15 
Price 6F560 6,580 6,580 	 66610 6,620 6t620
6,62 

Source: NACF
 
Note: 	 Average rising-rate of price by day is 0.3 percent. Unit is won per

75 kg (bag). Above price is average wholesaler's price in five major
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Table 111-12: Geographic Price Difference in Soybeans, 1970
 
Month
 
Cities 1 2 3 
- 4 5 6' 7 8 9 10 
 11 2 Average
 
Seoul 
 5,485 6,151 5,900 5,664 5,579 5,834 5,833 6,335 7,017 5,538 5,910 5,660 
5,913
 
Pusan 
 5,494 6,128 5,961 5,755 5,698 5,935 5,967 6,379 7,143 5,948 5,894 5,887 
6,016
 
Taegu 
 5,496 5,594 5,947 5,700 5,768 5,815 5,951 6,229 6,837 6,19016,094 6,330 
5,996
 
Kwangju 4,919 5,767 5,839 5,700 5,717 5,860 6,071 6,050 16,567 5,758 5,584 5,824 
 5,805
 
Taejon 
5,224 5,684 6,010 5,894 6,000 6,003 6,133 6,254 6,6443 5,278 5,440 5,617 
5,848
 
Average 5,324 5,865 5,932 5,743 5,733 5,890 6,001 6,250 6,841 5,742 5,784 5,864 
 5,916
 
Source: NACF
Note: 
 Above price is average wholesaler's price by five major cities in 1970. 
 Unit is
 
won per 75 kg (bag).
 
The problems of performance and barriers to improvement are similar to
 
those discussed for grains except that the government has made very little
 
effort to manage the stocks or to stabilize prices. Consideration should be
 
given to the potentia± for implementing a minimum forward price at a level
 
which would not result in an income transfer, but would add certainty to
 
market prices. 
Another potential is development of a contract system be­
tween larger processors and farmers. 
 Considerable work needs to be done 
on
 
both farm technology and processing. 
The soybean offers considerable poten­
tial for adding quality and variety to the national diet at relatively low
 
costs. 
 The major use of the contract system can be to transmit technical
 
inputs and technical knowledge to farmers while guaranteeing them a market
 
for their output.
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Potatoes
 
Table 111-13 shows reported average annual prices for potatoes. The
 
data indicate that sweet potato prices have been steadily increasing since
 
1965 at a rate slightly greater than the wholesale price index. 
White
 
potatoes, in contrast, have shown more price variability.
 
Average annual prices reported are those received by farmers.
 
Table 111-13: Average Annual Prices for Potatoes 
Year 
White Potatoes 
Medium Quality 
Sweet Potatoes 
Medium Quality 
1965 51 I 31 
1966 52 34 
1967 61 38 
1968 58 43 
1969 54 48 
1970 62 55 
Note: Unit is
won per 3.75 kg (bag)
 
This report is restricted to consideration of sweet potatoes. 
The
 
market channel map is shown in Figure 111-4 for table-use sweet potatoes.
 
Basic statistics on margins and price differences are presented in Tables
 
111-14 through 111-17. Marketing costs, at about half the retail price
 
for table-use potatoes, are related to the high bulk to value ratio. 
It
 
is also related to the complex channel of very small traders.
 
Producer 21.8% 'Coop Processor
 
Total 23% (processing use)
 
1.2% 
77%
 
(table use)
(tabl use)Collecting and
 
_ > Shipping Merchants 
Collecting Consigning

Merchants Wholesale Retailer 
 Consumers 
Date: June 1968 
 Main channel
 
Source: NACF Partial channel
 
re 111-4: Sweet Potato Market Channels
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Table 111-14: 	 Marketing Cost and Margins for Table-Use Sweet Potatoes
 
Selling Total.Margins
 
Classification Price Costs Margins Total Rate
 
Producer 	 24 

-

-
- 52.4
 
Wholesaler 35 
 8 3 11 52.4
 
Retailer 	 45 3 7 
 10 47.6
 
Total 	
-10 
 21 100.0
 
Source: NACF
 
Note: Areas surveyed: Suburb 8 km Kwangju. Marketing costs represent 46
 
percent (21/45) of retail price. 
Unit is won per 3.75 kg (kwan)

Date: 1968.6
 
Table 111-15: 	 Index of Seasonal Prices of Sweet Potatoes
 
Month 
 Rate of

Year 1 2 3 4 5 
 6 
 7 8 9 i0 11 12 Fluctuation
 
1966 81.4 88.4 93.0 90.7 111.6 116.3 172.1 120.9 
97.7 74.4 72.1 79.0 100.0
 
1967 74.4 82.9 
 85.11 89.4 100.0 112.7 138.3 138.3 110.6 85.1 82.9 93.6 74 73.9
 
1968 92.0 104.0 106.01106.0 108.0 108.0 - 144.0 82.0 80.0 84.0 88.0 
 64.0
 
1969 83.8 93.5 101.6 101.6 111.3 127.4 
 - 156.4 95.2 79.0 79.0 45.2 
 77.4
 
1970 78.7 91.3 110.0 110.0 141.2 - - 157.5 105.0 76.3 
68.7 82.5 	 88.8
 
Ave. 82.6 92.0. 99.51 99.5 114.4 

-. - 143.2 98.3 78.9 77.3 87.7 65.9 
Source: NACF
 
Note: Above is index number. July is just-pre-harvest time.
 
Table 111-16: 	 Day-to-Day Wholesale Price Variation for Sweet Potatoes,
 
May, 1971
 
May May May 	May May May May May May May May May May May May
By Day 1 2 
 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
(won)(won)i(won) (won)(won)(won)(won)(won)(won)(won)(won)(won)(won) (won) (won) 
Price 91 92 J 92 91 92 90 90 	 92 92 92 95 95 95 98 98 
Source: NACF
 
Note: Rate of rising price by day is 0.5 percent. Above price is average whole­
saler's price of 5 major cities in Korea.
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Table 111-17: Geographic Wholesale Price Differences in Sweet Potatoes in 1970
 
Month-

City 1 2 3 4 5 7' 8 9 ii61 10 12 Average 
Seoul 64 74 85 
 93 - - 114 78 61 61 73 78 
Pusan 49 67 88 103 114 - - 154 101 60 55 67 87 
Taegu 84 100 105 105 120 - - 133 71 67 7499 96 
Kwangju 47 51 60 76 - - - 68 50 43 5986 48 

Taejon 
 72 75 77 78 135 - - 116 76 59 51 64 80 
Average 63 73 83 88 113 - - 126 84 61 55 66 80 
Source: NACF
 
Note: Unit is won per 3.75 kg (kwan)
 
The price data indicate large seasotial price increases which seem to be
 
fairly predictable. The increases reflect the high cost of storage which
 
is considerably above the interest costs and seasonals in most other commod­
ities. The geographic price differences reflect both a high cost of trans­
portation and an apparent lack of an organized national market in sweet
 
potatoes.
 
Uses of Sweet Potatoes
 
Until 1960, demand for sweet potatoes was limited mostly to use as
 
a second-choice food in human diets and feed; there was little used for
 
industrial purposes. But, the government adopted a policy in 1961 to re­
place the raw material for alcohol with sweet potatoes, thus increasing
 
the industrial demand for sweet potatoes.
 
The government has encouraged cultivation under contract for the stated
 
purposes of improving farmer's income, expanding demand for agricultural pro­
ducts through agricultural processing, and replacing imported raw materials.
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Cultivation under contract has become a service of the agricultural cooper­
ative,
 
The results of the program as of 1965 are reported by A. L. Larson,.
 
and H. H. Hulbert:
 
In its efforts to carry out governmental instructions and direc­
tives, NACF sometimes finds itself financing processors. A case in
 
point is the 1965 sweet potato program, now facetiously referred to
 
as the sweet potato program that went sour. 
 In the eyes of the farmer,

NACF was responsible and freely blamed foj 
the shortcomings of the pro­
gram. Our investigation indicates, however, that there were circum­
stances over which NACF had no control.
 
We are 
told that in 1965 M[AF, through ORD and other agencies,
 
encouraged farmers to increase their production of sweet potatoes.

The response was gratifying and figures indicate that production was
 
nearly quadrupled over the previous year. 
MAF determined the price

that would be paid for sweet potatoes and then directed NACF to begin
buying at that price. NACF inventoried its financial resources, made
 
an allocation of funds to be used for sweet potato purchases and be­
gan buying. As purchases were made, sales on 
credit were negotiated

with starch, alcohol, and glucose processors. Under the terms of
 
sale, as related to us, the processors were to pay 20% cash upon de­
livery of the sweet potatoes and given four months for payment of the
 balance. 
 During this credit period, the sweet potatoes were to be
 
processed and the products sold. 
However, the processors did not
 
make good on their 20% cath downpayment on potatoes delivered and they

have been unable to sell the processed products either domestically
 
or for export at prices that would cover their costs of production.
 
NACF continued to buy sweet potatoes from farmers at the govern­
ment established prices until their funds allocated for sweet potato

purchases were exhau3ted. 
At the end of the season, farmers were
 
left with a substantial volume of sweet potatoes on hand, some of
 
which were reported to be rotting. Others were sliced and dried in
 
order to preserve them. 
The prospect for a satisfactory market for
 
the balance of the crop, however, appeared to be poor. Such experi­
ences are bound to shake the faith of farmers in the word of their
 
government and in the effectiveness of NACF as their marketing agent.l/
 
The idea of contracting for desired supplies, nevertheless, appears to
 
be basically sound. 
The problems appear to be inappropriate use and prac­
tices in instituting the contract program between NACF and the processors.
 
These contracts have involved difficulties, including a'substantial
 
1/A. L. Larson and H. H. Hulbert, "Study of Agricultural Cooperatives in
 
Korea," March, 1966.
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delinquency in assessments to NACF. 
The NACF does not contract with farmers.
 
Attempts have been made to offer forward prices and encourage appropriate
 
supplies for the industrial processing.
 
System problems reported include delay in announcement of the "forward"
 
price until after planting time, unrealistic prices, lack of accuracy and
 
reliability of quoted prices, and lack of uniformity in inspection which
 
cause discrepancies between expected and realized prices by farmers. 
 The
 
program could be successful in stimulating appropriate supplies 'y improving
 
estimates of product needs (demands for the processed product), adequate
 
funding and providing reliable prices.
 
Consideration should be given to contracting between the processors
 
and farmers with the NACF acting as broker. The forward price could be de­
termined by farmers' bids to supply desired quantities of raw materials by
 
the processors. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) should pro
 
vide funds to assure payment on contracted supplies as long as the proLes­
sors are in serious financial difficulty.
 
The Fruit Systems
 
The potential market and market coordination for fruits are especiall,
 
important in the future development of Korean agriculture because of the
 
large area of upland which seems 
to be well suited to fruit production.
 
Population project±ons indicate that the upland areas will have surplus
 
Ilbor and fruit production is labor intensive.
 
A detailed description of fruits (apples, peaches and grapes) in the
 
marketing system follows.
 
Problems of performance and barriers to improvement of the fruit sys­
tem are several. 
While fruit farms are larger than average farms and market
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almost all of their'"roduction, they da not appear to be market oriented,
 
Varieties better adapted to the needs of the market need to be developed.
 
The lack of good trading grades and standards make it difficult to accu­
rately reflect consumer preferences through the price system. Packaging
 
methods and materials need to be improved to better preserve the fruit and
 
reduce shipping and handling costs. Some additional storage capacity is
 
needed at harvest time. Also, more adequate credit is necessary to reduce
 
the pressure for immediate sales at harvest, in the case of storable fruits,
 
and the tie-ia between financing and marketing at terms disadvantageous to
 
the farmer.
 
The Central Wholesale Market law was designed to foster organized
 
spot markets. However, a large portion of supplies bypass both the central
 
markets and the NACF markets. The idea of fostering organized wholesale
 
markets is a good one. Such markets can perform a coordinating function
 
for the whole system by providing a system for price determination and price
 
information. However, it is not necessary or efficient to attempt to force
 
all supplies through these markets. This is especially true because the
 
market centers and the central wholesale markets are operated by employees
 
who are not under the same incentives for aggressive performance as the
 
private merchants.
 
The most pressing problem in the future for the fruit systems Is the
 
problem of coordinating supplies with demands in the process of substan­
tial growth. While fruit production has been growing rapidly in percent­
age terms since 1965 and demand has increased more rapidly than supply (as
 
indicated by the fact that fruit prices have increased more than either all
 
prices or all food prices), the fact remains that the market for fruit is
 
very small and any substantial increase in production would result in
 
-36­
disstrous prices to farmers. Farm prices from 1965-70 are.shown by
 
Table III-18.
 
Table III-18: Average Annual Fruit Prices Received by Farmers
 
Fruit
 
APPLE PERSIMMON GRAPE CHESTNUT PEAR PEACH ORANGE 
"Gookgwang"P Onju

Year "Mongok" "Bansi" "Changsi- Milkam,
 
Medium Medium Medium Medium prang" "Paikto" Medium
 
Quality Quality Quality Quality "Mansomkil" "Sumilto" Quality
 
18.75 kg 100 pieces 3.75 kg 100 1 50 pieces 3.75 kg 3.75 kg
 
1965 520 269 169 5,037 612 80 588
 
1966 502 285 199 7,808 543 73 600
 
1967 593 379 232 8,202 689 110 767
 
1968 747 472 204 9,056 783 94 870
 
1969 773 539 309 12,208 857 123 1,029
 
1970 970 788 290 14,700 1,071 124 1,094
 
Any successful plan to greatly expand upland fruit production will
 
require the development of new market institutions. Consideration should
 
be given to developing strong associations of producers to provide for effec­
tive sustained growth of the fruit systems. The associations could promote
 
improved technology in production to develop lower cost production of com­
modities oriented to market demands, identify potential markets, manage sup­
plies and provide the price security needed to stimulate investment in fruit
 
production. Within prescribed limits the associations could have formal
 
authority to manage supplies and to influence prices related to uses and
 
grades in order to stimulate processing and contribute to price stability.
 
The association could operate through contractual relationships to obtain
 
the services needed for physical distribution ard stimulate large scale
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multiple product assembly, etc., while providing the coordination function
 
for producers. Special cooperatives could provide the beginning of in­
stitutions needed to effectively develop and coordinate the fruit systems,
 
although they are not currently performing this function.
 
Fruits are a minor portion of agricultural production and food con­
sumption. Value of fruit production increased from less than 1 percent
 
of the farm value of food crops to nearly 2 percent during the 1960s. Apples,
 
peaches, pears, grapes, oranges, and persimmons are marketed in commercial
 
quantities.
 
While Korean consumers "Uke fresh fruits, fruits are very high priced
 
relative to incomes, restricting consumption. Only a very small portion of
 
fruit production is processed; again the high costs of fruit relative to in­
come restricts the potential market for fruit for processing.
 
Special studies of three of the major fruits (apples, peaches and
 
grapes) were made between 1968 and 1972. Information from these studies
 
and related data indicate the status of marketing for fruits.
 
Apples
 
Figure 111-5 shows the typical channels for apples moving from Tae-Ku
 
to Seoul. Apple farms are relatively large, which explains the relatively
 
large percentage (23 percent) of apples moving directly frum farmiers to
 
the Seoul wholesale market. The existence of large apple production units,
 
about 10 relatively large private merchants dealing in apples and a devel­
oped auction wholesale market in Seoul operated by NACF, has facilitated
 
relatively simple channels and relatively large operations compared with
 
other fruits and vegetables. Nevertheless, many small scale operators are
 
involved in the collection of apples and in the wholesaling function in Seoul.
 
Consignment 
Merchant in 
Pzoduction 
Area 
-­4 
Quasi-
Wholesaler%._ _ _ _\I_ Middlemen 
_ _ 
Apple Coip. 
Producer in Marketing Middlemen Retailer Consumer 
Production - Center Owned 
Area by NACF 
Direct Central Note: The map was made 
Shipment Wholesale Middlemen as the result of a fact-
Market finding survey during 
February 1971. 
Figure 111-5: Apple Market Channels from Tae-Ku to Seoul
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Apple retailing is extremely small scale, including many push cart retailers
 
specialized in apples.
 
Table 111-19 gives soTe indication of the marketing margin for apples
 
at a particular point in time in 1971 with a price spread between the farmer
 
and consumer of about 40 percent of the retail price. 
 Cost of storage is
 
included in the farmer's price as 
is his costs of delivering to the first
 
buyer, which may be the cooperative some distance from his farm. 
Thus, sig­
nificantly, the price spread does not include the storage costs.
 
Table 111-19: 	 Marketing Margin and Prices Received by Kuchwang Apple

Producers
 
Marketing Margin
Selling Marketing Cost Interest 
 Total
Channel Merchant 
 Price Value Rate Value Rate Value Rate
 
Through
 
Coop. IProducer 1,070 
­ - - - - -
IMarketing Center " (NACF) 	 1,530 
 380 24.8 	 80 460
5.2 30.0
 
Retailer 
 1,750 ­ - 220 12.6 220 12.6
 
Total 

- 380 21.8 300 17.1 680 38.9
 
Through

Merchant Producer 
 1,038 ­ -
 - - - -
Quasi-

Wholesaler 1,530 
 412 26.9 	 80 492
5.2 32.1
 
Retailer 1,750 
-
- 220 
 J2.6 220 12 6
 
Tot.l 

- 412 23.5 300 17.1 712 40.7
 
Source: NACF
 
Note: 
 The interest of NACF Marketing Center is commission.
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Pricing of apples at the wholesale level appears to be well organized and
 
efficient. 
While grades are not used and most apples are sold by inspection
 
of a representative box, communication of prices seems to be effective among
 
dealers. 
 Tables 111-20 and 111-21 indicate the day-to-day fluctuations in
 
average wholesale prices in the five major urban markets. 
 Some of the day­
to-day variations may be due to differences in average quality. 
The table
 
for May shows the effects of smaller volume available late in the season.
 
Table 111-20: Day-to-Day Price Variations for Apples, November, 1971
 
November
1 2 3 4 .45 6 7 

Price 1,183 
 1,217 1,217 1,200 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,238
 
November
9 10 11 12 ' 13 14 15 , Ave.
 
Price 1,238 
 1,275 1,250 1,288 1,250 i1,270 1,260 1,230
 
Source: NACF
 
Note: 
 Unit is Won per Kuchwang Box (18.75 kg)
 
Table 111-21: Day-to-Day Price Variations for Apples, May, 1971
 
2 -1 3 4 Ma 5 6 7
 
Price 1,710 1,784 1,790 1,790 1,794 1,834 1,890 
 1,892
 
May
 
10 1 
 12 
 13 
 14 
 15
 
Price 1,922 1,910 1,934 1,914 1,906 , 1,930 1,930
 
Source: NACF
 
Note: 
 Price is the average wholesale price of five NACF Marketing Centers lc
cated in Seoul, Pusan, Tae-Ku, Kwangju, Taijon, respectively. Unit is
Won per Kuchwang Bux (18.75 kg)
 
8 
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Table 111-22 is an index of seasonal wholesale price fluctuations using
 
the average price for each year in 5 city markets. The average harvest in­
crease from October to May at the end of the effective storage season was
 
from 80 to 124. 
 The average increase in price Indicates the potential for
 
profitable storage. 
 The price relatively large spread between October and
 
December indicates that farmers are under pressure 
to sell at harvest and
 
that a shortage of short-time storage may e:ist. 
 Since on-farm storage is
 
common and apparently effective for at 
least part of the season, the need
 
for credit to keep the crops and build inexpens:ve on-farm storage may be
 
a more important factor in developing a more ec(onomic apple storage system
 
than the need for commercial storage facilities. However, the seasonal
 
price pattern and other evidence is sufficient to justify an economic feasi­
bility study of the potential for commercial storage facilities for apples.
 
Table 111-22: 
 Index of Seasonal Wholesale Price Fluctuations for Apples
 
Rate of
Month
Year .3 Fluctu­4 5 6 71 8.9 1 1 1 ation
 
1966 93.3),;1.02.4'124.1138.5! 

-
- 86.8 83.6 81.5 84.0105.5 57.0 
1967 94.6 9 /.7.108.]-'120.6 1114.4 
-

-
- 87.2 81.5 92.1103.8 
 1
 
1968 93.01 
98.2 1.00.9 '122.3 !165.2 

-

-
- 72.5 73.4 90.8 99.5 91.7 
1969 95.0 109.3 122.1 128.7 ­ - - - 92.2 82.6 91.2 107.5 37.5 
1970 94.9 1108.1 111.5 109.8 .
 . .. 109.2 12.6 
92.3 109.4 28.9
 
Ave. 
 94.2 103.i113.324.0 

-
- 86.8 88.91 80.3 188.1;1105.1 50.8 
Source- NACF 

_ , _!Note: Tile 
-. 
index is calculated on average wholesale price of five NACF Marketing
Centers. 
 The degree of price fluctuation is rather high before harvest time.
 
Table 111-23 shows the average wholesale price differences for apples
 
for the 5 major cities by months for period in 1)70, and indicates the market
 
- -
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is working reasonably well in the geographic distribution of apples. Per­
formance seems good in this respect, but coordination could be improved,
 
Table 111-23: Geographic Price Differences for Apples in 1970
 
Marketing Month 
Center 1 2 1 3 4 . 5 6 7 9 10 11 12-Ave. 
Seoul 1,234 ii,25811,358 1,485 1,71.4 1,963; 
- - i - - - 1,546 11,450 
Pusan 975 1,10811,164 .1,372 1,658 1,737 1,474 1,355 
Taeku 1,158 1,232 ii,249 1,445 1,533 3,716 1,436 1,396 
Kwangju 890 965 950 '1,064 .1,281 1,634 i - -
- 1,217 1,143 
Taejon 1,045 !i,2301,250,280!1,527 1,592 1,180 1,301 
Average 1,061 1,159 1,195 3,329 1,543 1,688 -1,371 1,335
 
Source: NACE .. 
-....... 
ilote: One box contains about a hundred superior a3ples. Unit is Won per 18.75 kg box
 
Apples appear to be the fruit with the best export potential in the
 
near future, based upon current production and processing technology. Bar­
riers to expanded exports of apples include: 
1. Appearance, especially in color, of Korean apples is not as
 
appealing as that of apples exported from Japan, New Zealand, Australia$
 
Argentina, etc., which are the main competitors in apple export.
 
2. Domestic prices of apples are higher than world market prices be­
cause of high production cost and marketing expenses due to the small
 
scale of operation and inadequate technology.
 
3. The preservation of freshness is difficult.
 
4. Quality of packing materials, packing methods, packing and design 
technology are poor.
 
5. Inadequate information about the world market situation.
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Table 111-24 indicates exports from 1968-1970.
 
Table 111-24: Apple Exports by Country and Year
 
Country Cuty16Year1968 
Quantity Value 
1969 
Quantity Value 
197o 
Quantity Value (MT) ($1000) (Mr) ($000)" (MT) ($1000 
R. China 1,477 312 1,810 348 1,815 374 
Philippines 1,534 194 1,942 244 485 55 
Thailand 5 1 5 1 4 1 
Singapore 
- 400 33 307 38 
Malaya " " 
- 58 7 
Indonesia 150 20 
U.S.A. 
. 180 19 
Liberia 
-
-
- 87 10 
Total 3,105 521 5,055 737 3,085 .524 
Note: 
 Figures are on the basis of entry from Office of Customs Adminis­
tration, of ROK.
 
Apples are an important crop for the 53 special cooperatives which han­
dled about 22 percent of the crop in 1971; 
thus the volume handled by each
 
is small. 
 The volume handled by any one coop appears insufficient to achieve
 
any significant economies of scale and, since the coops do not coordinate
 
their marketing, the cooperative system does not offer the potential con­
tribution in coordinating the flow of apples to market to either maximize
 
returns to growers or nationalize the system.
 
Peaches
 
Figure 111-6 indicates market channels showing the typical flow of
 
peaches to market. The special cooperatives are an important channel in
 
peach marketing, accounting for more than half of total marketing. 
Considering
 
Collector and 
Consignee in 
Production 
Area 
Large 
Collectors 
from Consump-
tion Area 
! 
Quasi-
Wholesalers 
in 
Consignment 
Middlemen 
rR 
U 
e 
r 
d. 
0 0NACF 
, 
MarketingMiden 
Center / 
/ 
e 
a 
i "C 
0 
n 
" in ProductionArea ! Processors WholesaleMarket Middlemen 
ti 
er 
Orchard 
Yard Sale 
Retailers or Circulating 
Retailers in Production Area 
Note: The map was made as a 
result of a field­
survey in December, 
1970. 
Figure 111-6: Marketing Channel for Peaches 
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the cost of labor and the services provided, the margin indicates poor mar­
keting performance. The margins at a point in time in1970 are indicated
 
by Table 111-25. Processing of peaches is a minor activity utilizing about
 
7 percent of the crop. Peaches are highly perishable and do not store well.
 
High prices of both raw product and of canning materials are barriers to
 
developing an effective processing enterprise. However, if production costs
 
could be reduced and volume expanded to achieve some economies of scale in
 
processing, processing could become important as a means of expanding the
 
market and adding some stability to annual price fluctuations. The develop­
ment of full line wholesalers for processors can be important to effective
 
distribution of the processed products. High costs of both wholesaling and
 
retailing are associated with the large number and extremely small scale of
 
wholesalers and retailers. Scale is so small that most wholesalers and re­
tailers cannot afford the storage facilities required to keep peaches in
 
good condition for any length of time.
 
Checks on price variations indicate that the day-to-day market prices
 
are fairly rational while the geographic coordination seems to be poor.
 
These data are indicated in Tables 111-26 and 111-27. The special cooper­
atives handle a large portion (52 percent) of the peaches but do not appear
 
to be performing an effective coordinating function.
 
Grapes
 
Figure 111-7 indicates typical marketing channels for grapes. Many
 
grapes apparently are produced near urban centers and are sold to consumers
 
who come to the vinLeyards for an outing. The special cooperatives do not
 
handle a very large proportion of the grapes. Grapes usually are produced
 
.for processing into Juice and wine. Grape processing has not been a very
 
Table 111-25: Marketing Margins for Fresh Peaches, 1970
 
Marketing Margin
 
Sales Marketing Cost Interest Total 
Channel Merchant. Price Value Rate 
(%) 
Value Rate () Value Rate () 
Through 
Coop. Producer 592.5 - - - - -
Marketing 
Center 850.0 249.0 29.3 8.5 1.0 257.5 30.0 
Retailer 1,340.0 10.0 0.8 480.0 35.8 40.0 36.6 
Total - 259.0 19.3 458.5 36.5 747.5 55.8 
Through 
Merchant Producer 575.5 - - - - - -
Middleman 850.0 257.5 30.3 17.0 2.0 274.5 32.3 
Retailer 1,340.0 10.0 0.8 480.0 35.8 490.0 36.6 
Total - 267.5 19.9 497.0 37.1 764.5 57.0 
Source: NACF 
Note: Interest of NACF is commission. Unit is Won per case (18 kg) 
Table 111-26; Day-to-Day Price Variations for Peaches, July 16-31, 1971
j
July
16 17 18 191 20 21 221 231 24 251 261 27 128 29 30 31 Ave.
 
Price 239 245 236 240 249 242 233 250 250 303 286 226 231 234 247 250 247
 
Note: Price is the average of wholesale price in five cities. Unit is Won
 
per 3.75 kg.
 
profitable enterprise in Korea and operates at a very small scale, based
 
apparently on low demand for processed grape products and high costs of
 
both raw product and processing.
 
The small quantity of fresh grapes going through commercial channels 
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Table II-27: Geographic Price Variations in Peaches, 1970
 
"' Month 
City 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Average 
Seoul 164 179 275 - - 206 
Pusan 349 375 317 - - 347 
Taeku - - - - - 145 181 1262. - - 196 
Kwangju - .7-- - 150 167 180 - - 166 
Taejon . .- 167 1133 223 - - 174 
Average - 195 1207 256 - - 218 
Note: 	 Above price is wholesale average price in five cities. Unit is Won
 
per 3.75 kg.
 
do not appear to be marketed efficiently, probably due to the very small
 
scale of operations. The retail margin, indicated in Table 111-28, seems
 
to be especially high, probably indicating that retailers have difficulty
 
in keeping grapes in salable condition. A check on daily price variations
 
and geographical price differences indicates the market is performing
 
poorly in pricing and allocating grapes through time and space, as shown
 
by Tables 111-29 and 111-30.
 
Table 111-28: Marketing Margin and Prices Received by Producers of Grapes,
 
August 26, 1970 (From Ansung to Seoul)
 
Marketing Margin
 
Sales Marketing Cost Interest Total
 
Channel Merchant Price Value Rate Value Rate Value Rate
 
Through !Producer 1,327.5 - - - - - -
Coop. JMktg. Ctr. 1,650.0 306.0 18.5 16.5 1.0 322.5 19.5 
Retailer 2,349.0 10.0 0.4 699.0 29.3 699.0 29.7 
Total - 316.0 13.4 705.5 30.1 1,021.5 43.5 
Through 1Producer 1,2651.5 - - - - -
Merchant IMiddlemen 1,650.0 339.0 20.5 49.5 30.0 388.5 23.5
 
Retailer 2,349.0 10.0 0.4 689.0 29.3 699 0 29.7
 
.__ Total - 349.0 14.9 738.5 31.4 1,081:5 46.3
 
Source: NACF
 
Note: The interest of Marketing Center is commission.
 
Processor Wholesalers Retailers 
Coop in Marketing Center
 
Production Area (NACF
 
Consignee Consignee 
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Sales to Wholesale 
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Figure 111-7: Market Channel for Grapes, 1970
 
Table IID 29: Day-to-Day Price Variations of Grapes, July 16-31, 1971
 
July
 
*16 .7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31A 
Price 11,283 1,100 957 897 897 1,132 1,074 1,040 1,040 1,060 1,010 980 960 970 1860 828 9!
 
: 3NA
75 kg)Sbic 

Note: Above price is the average of wholesaler price of five cities. Unit is won per

box (3.75 kg).
 
Table 111-30: Geographical Wholesale Price Differences in Grapes, 1970
 
Month December
 
City July August September October Average (cold
 
stored)
 
1eoil 506 380 635 678
:276 335 

?usan 1,422, 560 378 377 684. ­
raeju' 1,829 634 250 387 702 512 
Kwangju 1,200 391 260 260 528 ­
raeJon 1,050 400 320 - 590 ­
kverage 1,355 498 308 326 628 -
Source: NACF
 
Note: Uiiit is Won per box (3.75 kg)
 
Vegetables
 
Little research work appears to have been done on the marketing of veg­
etables. Since vegetables generally are produced in much smaller lots than
 
fruits and markets appear to be less well organized, grades and standards are
 
difficult co establish and market information is poorly developed; it can
 
be assumed that marketing costs are relatively high and performance of the
 
coordinating function is relatively poor. Problems in storage, packging
 
and handling are similar.
 
Only a very small portion of the vegetable production is processed
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commercially. Demand for commercially processed vegetables appears limited
 
due to relatively high cost processing, limited incomes, and consumer prefer­
ences. Food processing will expand as these conditions change, but improve­
ments in the marketing and storage of fresh vegetables seem to offer a greater
 
potential at this time than extensive investments in vegetable processing
 
facilities.
 
Table 111-31 shows the year-to-year var4ation in average prices of 10
 
vegetables. Price variations for individual farmers would be much greater
 
than the average. In some years it does not pay to harveot part of the crop.
 
Table 111-31: Average Prices of Farm Vegetables
 
Vegetables, Medium Quality
Carrot Cabbage Onion Cucumber Water Spinach 
Edible Taro Squash Eggplant

Year 
 Celery Burdock
 
1 kwan 1 kwan 1 kwan 1 kwan 1 kwan
 
3.75 kg 3.75 kg 3.75 kg 3.75 kg 3.75 kg
 
1965 114 67 95 66 58 88 148 68 46 77 
1966 94 47 60 68 71 86 136 104 38 64 
1967 108 84 114 70 76 106 155 106 39 62 
1968 160 66 119 65 - 137 181 94 39 48 
1969 96 49 76 65 - 113 169 109 44 56 
1970 236 81 215 73 185 188 254 161 50 65 
Clearly the price uncertainty and risk in vegetable production is high.
 
Such risk discourages specialized efficient vegetable production and results
 
in high costs in assembling small lots with difficult market coordination.
 
A system which could offer reasonable forward prices, announced prior to
 
?lanting, could greatly stimulate vegetab.e production and lower costs in
 
both growing and marketing. 
Marketing institutions could simultaneouslv
 
improve coord'Ination and transmit technical information to farmers in order
 
to improve product quality and productivity.
 
A system of contract farming is one potential method of coordinating
 
ve3etable marketing, adaptable to the developing Korean situation. Korea
 
already has had experience with contracts, some successful and some not.
 
Contracting is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
 
Tables 111-32 through 111-35 show seasoLLal, geographic, and daily price
 
variations for two important vegetables, radishes and Chinese cabbage.
 
These prices indicate the market is not performing well in allocating these
 
products through time and space.
 
Table 111-32: 	 Seasonal and Geographic Price Variations in Superior Quality
 
Radishes, 1970
 
!~~1 Month 
City Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. .. g. I Oct. Nov. Dec.'Ave. 
Seoul 90 117 142 !163 104 36 34 41 
 56 67 66 106 85
 
Pusan 95 103 134 1219 100 30 38 47 87 
 92 74 114 1 94 
Taegu 95 104 1108 !156 124 49 35 145 '74 90 59 106. 87 
Kwangju 68 85 !106 153 77 35 42 63 111 99 85 105 86 
Taejon 91 106 '100 139 110 29 51 I 83 10747 128 116 92
 
Average 87 103 118 166 1103 39 36 49 
 83 96 I 78 '109 89 
Note: Price is average of five cities. Unit is Won per 3.75 kg 
Table 111-33: 	 Seasonal and Geographic Price Variations in Superior Quality
 
Chinese Cabbage
 
Month 
Jan. Feb. *Mar. Apr May JuiL. Jul. Aug. Se. Oct. Nov. Ave. 
I
 
Seoul 57 75 ;128 245 66 33 40 52 
 84 102 68 129 90
 
Pusan 67 79 j116 185 83 19 51 82 112 113 69 185 94
 
Taegu 65 83 87 139 86 38 40 65 104 137 
 68 145 88
 
Kwangju 47 63 63 117 59 28 45 101 lbl 110 70 148 84
 
Taejon 62 76 71 101 61 28 28 62 113 139 79 116 78
 
Average 60 75 93 157 65 41 72 115
28 120 71 1144 ' 87
 
Note: Price is average of five cities. Unit is Won per 3.75 kg.
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Table 111-34: Day-to-Day Price Variations for Radishes 
(Wholesale), August l-i5, 1970
 
i-- 2 3 ____4 5 August8 9 1 111 T12-13 14,1 Ave. 
NoteisisSeul Unit 
Price 140 140 1130 120 'iui 120 1 0 1 130 1130 !180 200 220 11801 1801 148 
Note: Unit is Won per 3.75 kg, location is Seoul.
 
Table 111-35: 
 Day-to-Day Price Variations, Chine.E Cabbage (Wholesale), August 1-15, 197 
- August 
1 2 3 4 7 12 "1 1 3 14l50Ave. 
- i50 ] I 1 ' 
Price 150 150 1.20 110 90 75 '100 100 !130 '125 1220 1280 1240 230 ! 157 
Note: Unit is Won per 3.75 kg; location is Seoul.
 
Livestock and Related Products
 
Typical marketing channel maps, some indication of price margins and
 
seasonal and geographic differences in reported prices in livestock and re­
lated products are reproduced in the appendix of this report. 
Only very gen­
eral comments will be made about the organization, problems and performance 
of the markets for these commodities. IWhile these commodities will become 
much more important as the economy develops, they are currently of relatively 
minor importance in both farm income and Korean diets. 
 Also the data for
 
livestock and meat involve especially difficult problems because of changes
 
in form as it moves 
through the marketing channel, and the difficulty of
 
getting data on comparable or equivalent products either at different stages
 
in the channel or between points in time and space.
 
Cattle and hogs 
are produced in very small units. A preliminary report,
 
from AERI, of the area supplying the Seoul market indicates that the aver­
age number of cattle marketed in 1971 was 1.2 head per cattle-feeding farm.
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The comparable estimate for hogs was 1.3. Livestock assemblers also were
 
very small scale operators, the majority handling less than 200 head per
 
yeal,
 
Coordination of information in the system seems relatively poor. 
Many
 
transactions in cattle are made on the basis of visual estimates rather than
 
weight. While scales are available in the staging markets an AERI study in­
dicated that less than 16 percent of the cat~le were sold in these markets
 
on scale-measured weight.
 
Scale of operations in slaughtering plants also is -xtremely small. A
 
sample of 7 plants within the legitimate market found them slaughtering an
 
average of 8.5 hogs and 3.0 cattle per operating day, which was at a rate
 
below 20 percent of their intended operating capacity.
 
Seoul has a larger scale licensed slaughter plant which operates in con­
nection with the central wholesale market. Recently, it has been slaughtering
 
300 cattle and 800 hogs per operating day which represents only about 20
 
percent of its intended capacity. The central wholesale market charges a
 
commission equivalent to about 6 percent of the farm value of livestock and,
 
more importantly, a tax equivalent to about another 6 percent of farm value
 
is assessed on r,1I 
livestuck as they move through the central wholesale
 
market. It is esttnited that more than 50 percent of the livestock is moved
 
outside of this legal channel in order to avoid the tax. The result is that 
slaughter takes place in very small plants under sanitary conditions of an 
unknown quality without the benefit of inspection of any kind. Removal of 
the tax would reduce the disincentive to use the central market, making it 
possible to achieve economies of scale both in the market and in slaughtering.
 
The increased volume could permit a reduced commission at the market and 
certainly would improve the sanitary conditions of the meat. Apparently the 
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application of taxes and commissions in asseinu.Ly martes aiso resuirs In
 
livestock being moved outside legal channels, with higher real costs to the
 
system and reduced effectiveness of the coordinating function of the market.
 
The system does not appear to be effective in transmitting consumer pre­
ferences for particular cuts and grades of meat; a grading system for meat
 
exists but is not used in general trade. The development and use of stand­
ardized cutting and identification of cuts, and perhaps some simple grading
 
sho4ld be considered.
 
Other Products
 
Channel maps and some cost and price information related to markets
 
is included in the appendix for a few additional products as representatives
 
of a class of products. 
Most of the markets share the problems discussed
 
above. Typically, there is lack of standardization in trading units, and
 
a large number of transactions by many very small producers. 
Problems
 
related to the level and timing of price announcements, and in the fair
 
application of inspection, affect commodities involving government purchase
 
Dr forward pricing arrangements.
 
Chapter 4 
DELIVERY SYSTEM FOR TECHNICAL FORM INPUTS 
Introduction
 
Optimum use-by farmers of technical inputs requires
 
1. An effective and reliable delivery system for the total package
 
of complementary inputs, including technical knowledge
 
2. Credit for purchasing inputs, and
 
3. Reliable product markets to reduce the risk associated with new
 
methods and the acquisition of a debt.
 
Discussions follow on fertilizers, agricultural chemicals, improved
 
seeds, farm implements, formulated processed feeds, and system modification.
 
Table IV-l shows the price indexes for major purchased inputs. The
 
index of prices received (1965=100) for all farm products in 1970 was esti­
mated at 191; 182 for grain and 244 for fruits and vegetables. The index
 
of prices for all farm supplies was 195. Prices of fertilizers and farm
 
chemicals however, were much lower relative to farm prices han in 1965.
 
The decreasing ratio of fertilizer and farm chemical prices to product
 
prices can be an important factor in stimulating the use of these technical
 
inputs.
 
Fertilizer
 
Fertilizer distribution is a monopoly entrusted by the Government to
 
NACF. The distribution channel is shown below in Figure IV-I along with
 
the commissions received by the different units.
 
Table IV-2 shows trends in the percentage of fertilizer purchased by
 
farmers on credit. The low percentage sold on credit probably is related to
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Table IV-1: Price Indexes for Major Purchased Farm Inputs
 
Commodity and Weight 
Year/Month Seeds Livestock Fertilizer 
Farm 
Chemical 
Farm 
Implements 
Equipping 
Materials 
7.13 88.58 114.40 8.49 13.50 5.12 
1965 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1966 110.5 124.5 100.0 103.6 112.4 110.4 
.1967 96.3 178.3 87.2 99.7 121.3 110.4 
1968 112.3 278.6 87.2 113.7 135.5 113.7 
1969 189.7 290.3 93.5 114.9 145.4 116.5 
1970 273.0 335.1 96.6 109.7 168.3 125.4 
1970/8 275.7 354.6 96.6 112.6 172.0 125.2 
9 260.7 353.8 96.6 114.8 174.3 125.5 
10 260.7 345.8 96.6 113.2 176.1 125.9 
11 260.7 352.1 96.6 113.2 177.7 126.9 
12 260.7 357.3 96.6 113.2 177.1 125.6 
1971/1 260.7 366.5 96.6 113.2 178.3 126.2 
2 268.3 377.6 96.6 113.2 177.4 125.6 
3 271.3 404.5 96,,6 112.0 179.2 125.5 
4 266.6 463.2 96.6 113.3 184.4 125.1 
5 266.6 468.0 96.6 112.8 186.0 124.2 
6 266.6 461.8 96.6 112.7 186.9 124.6 
7 266.6 466.0 96.6 113.4 188.4 124.0 
8 316.0 478.7 96.6 113.4 186.5 123.6 
9 342.6 484.7 96.6 113.7 191.4 126.6 
10 342.6 498.5 96.6 113.7 191.4 128.4 
N.A.. opV Ri-Dong Coop Farmers 
Commission as of December 31, 1971 
(Won per M/T) 
N.A.C.F. 31.2 
Gun Agr. Coop 93.6 
Ri-Dong Agr. Coop 31.2 
Total 156.0 
Figure IV-1: Fertilizer Marketing Channels and Commissioni
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the conditions of the loan agreement. Interest rates for the first 6 to
 
8 months are low at 8.4 percent, for the next 12 months 19 percent and for
 
those over due (over about 1 1/2 years) the rate is 31.2 percent. (These
 
rates are planned for 1972.)
 
Most significant, however, is the tie between credit purchases and the
 
required repayment in kind which is part of the Government Grain Management
 
Program. Credit sales require repayment 1.n grain at prices set at 300 Won
 
above the Government grain purchase price, which in 1969 and 1970 was usually
 
about 1,000 Won less than the farm market price.- / Thus the effective interest
 
rate on short-term credit purchases of fertilizer was very high.
 
Table IV-2: Percentage of Fertilizer 
Sold on Credit 
Year Percentage 
1966 68 
1967 49 
1968 47 
1969 47 
1970 34 
1971 30 
The net effect of the combination of pricing practices for fertilizers
 
is difficult to determine. The Government has a long-term purchase agree­
ment for nitrogen at prices apparently above the world market price. Urea
 
is sold to NACF under this agreement at about 430 Won per ton above its
 
selling price to farmers. NACF is then paid the 430 Won difference and the
 
156 Oon commission by MAF. NACF then sells at an interest rate nominally
 
below the market rate, but tied to a disadvantaged barter agreement.
 
1/ For example, in November 1969, the farm price of rice wa3 5,699 Won and
 
the government purchase price was 4,200, making the repayment price 4,500
 
Won-nearly a 20 percent difference.
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The elimination of the barter arrangement on fertilizer credit appears
 
highly desirable, since barter probably affects fertilizer sales adversely
 
and reduces the effectiveness of the NACF input supply program. In addition
 
careful consideration to the price policy is required to determine if fer­
tilizer pricing achieves optimum use of the existing fertilizer resources.
 
Apparently excess capacity exists in production facilities. Perhaps an
 
agreement could be made with the firm to purcha:,e ).uitiona± fertilizer,
 
above the level of the current agreement, at a price near the marginal cost
 
of production, to permit the reduction in the average price.
 
Table IV-3 shows the rates of increase in fertilizer use.
 
Table IV-3: Extent and Rate of Increase
 
in Use of Fertilizer
 
Year Lmnsumption Rate of Increase 
(MT) (%) 
1968 478,460 
1969 534,689 11.8 
1970 569,902 6.6 
1971 605,137 6.2 
Performance of the fertilizer delivery system is difficult to judge.
 
Potential exists for a highly rational, low-cost system, but problems in­
clude inventory management and possibly poor service to farmers. Fertil­
izer is available only at the Gun Coops or at those Ri-Dong Coops which
 
function; hence purchasing fertilizer and getting timely delivery may
 
lnwlve difficulty for the small farmer, while purchase and credit procedures
 
may not be customer oriented.
 
Inventory management and storage create other problems. Inaccurate
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estimates of needs have resulted in some excess stocks and storage space
 
seems to be inadequate. Little has been done'to solve the storage problem
 
by encouraging farmers to make advanced orders or contracts for future pur­
chase or to store fertilizer on the farm. The only incentive for the latter
 
is that fertilizer purchased in January or February does not require the
 
payment of interest during these months. A seasonal differential in fer­
tilizer prices should be considered to iTprove the storage management. Cur­
rently no seasonal price difference exists.
 
Agricultural Chemicals
 
There are two major channels for the distribution of agricultural
 
chemicals; through NACF and private merchants. The NACF buys from formu­
lators and distributes to the Gun Coops, which in turn distribute to both
 
viable Ri-Dong Coops and directly to farmers. The typical private channel
 
is formulator-to-large wholesaler-to-small wholesaler-to-retailer. NACF
 
sells about 14 percent of the basic agricultural chemicals (pesticides, etc.).
 
Consumption of agricultural chemicals, shown in Table IV-4, more than
 
doubled from 1967 to 1970 (9,989 to 25,024 metric ton). This trend resulted
 
from the intensive implementation of joint spray of farm chemicals for crop
 
protection.
 
Table IV-4: Annual Use of Farm Chemicals
 
Year Consumption Rate of Increase 
(MT) (Z) 
1967 9,989 
1968 9,983 0.4 
1969 17,531 75.6 
1970 25,024 42.7 
Source: MAF 
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Problems exist in the pricing of chemicals through NACF with NACF
 
staff estimating costs and MAF deciding upon retail prices. 
NACF receives
 
a 1 percent commission and the Gun and Ri-Dong Coops share a commission of 
4 percent. The competitive role of private merchants in setting prices is
 
not clear,
 
A major problem for NACF appears to lie in estimating demand and pro­
viding the proper supplies of chemicals at the time they are needed without
 
accumulating excessive inventories. No procedure of advanced orders by
 
farmers to improve inventory management seems to be used. Consideration
 
should be given to a pricing policy that offers discounts or other incentives
 
for advanced orders. 
 The cooperative service also may be inconvellient and
 
service may not be customer-oriented.
 
While chemicals used on paddy are offered on credit at no interest if
 
repaid at the end of the season, and 19 percent for the next 6 months, only
 
about 20 percent of the agricultural chemicals are sold on credit. Chemicals
 
sold for horticulture are cash sales. The low percentage sale on credit
 
indicates a barrier to obtaining the credit, given the evidence of the level
 
of borrowing by farmers from other sources at high rates of interest.
 
Given the credit sales at no interest and the costs of maintaining in­
ventories, a 5 percent commission does not cover th, costs of delivering
 
chemicals through the NACF channel.
 
A regulatory and inspection system for testing content, safety and sta­
bility of both private and NACF chemicals is operated by the National Agri­
cultural Input Inspection Office.
 
The performance of the private channel cannot be judged due to the
 
lack of data other than the fact that it is presumably making a profit in
 
a market supplied by NACF at below costs. This indicates that the private
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ierchanto must offer services or products not supplied.'by the NACF channel.
 
Improved Seeds 
The two major channels for improved seeds a& LjU.&vw&w w&%;usm.y 
oop producing the seeds to NACF to Gun Coops to farmers and 2) producer, 
holesaler, retailer in the private channel. The coop channel handles an
 
nknown percentage of the improved seeds. 
 In addition, ORD has responsibil­
ty for the development of the new rice variecy (IR-667) which is distributed
 
rom MAF to Gun office to Myun office to farmers.
 
A certified seed program is operated by the Agricultural Products
 
n-spection Office and certifies 80 percent of the seeds marketed by NACF
 
and none of the seeds marketed through the private dealers.
 
The NACF credit terms and conditions are the same as described for
 
agricultural chemicals. 
About 80 percent are sold on credit. The NACF
 
comnuiscion on seeds is nearly the same 
as on chemicals. Government subsidy
 
on NACF seeds distribution amounted to 15 percent of selling price to farmers.
 
Table IV-5: 	 Supply and Rate of Increase in
 
Sales of Improved Seeds
 
Year Supply Rate of Increase 
(Thousand Won) (%) 
1966 31,949 
1967 228,637 615.6 
1968 503,875 120.4 
1969 153,421 69.6 
1970 168,116 9.6 
The performance problems are similar to those of other inputs, centering
 
on inventory management and responsiveness to farmers' needs, as well as
 
organizing the supply of domestically produced seeds.
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Farm Implements
 
Channels, credit terms and conditions as well as problems in distribution&'
 
are the same as for agricultural chemicals, with an additional problem o'f
 
supplying the servicing for equipment sold. 
 Since service is essential to
 
an equipment suppl? system this is a critical factor. 
About 10-20 percent
 
of NACF sales are on credit.
 
Sales uo equipment have expanded rapidly as shown in Table IV-6.,
 
Table IV-6: 
 Extent and Rate of Increase in
 
Sales of Farm Implements by NACF
 
Year Supply Rate of Increase 
Million Won) (%) 
1966 472 ­
1967 798 
 69.0
 
1968 
 920 15.3
 
1969 2,052- 123.0
 
1970 2,218 8.1
 
Formulated Processed Feeds 
Cooperative and private channels are indicated by Figure IV-28
 
F---I 
Maker (Livestock coop)
 
Retailer 	 I gnyDirect 
igrSale Shop 
V 17 
Figure IV-2: Channels for Formulated Processed Feedi
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Sal s through the special livestock cooperatives are off4,red on credit,
 
tncludinz a barter arrangement. About 20 percent of sales have been'on
 
credit.
 
Ude of formulated processed feeds have been increasing as indicated
 
in Tab4 IV-7.
 
Table IV-7: 
 Extent and Rate of Increase
 
in Use of Formulated Feeds
 
ear' Supply Rate of Increase 
(MT) (M)
 
1967 16,081
 
1968 42,000 161.2
 
1969 59,073 40.7
 
1970 76,008 28.7
 
TabA IV-8 indicates the margins at a point in time,
 
.rable IV-8: 
 Marketing Costs and M&rgins for Formulated Feed, July 1971
 
Prices Prices 
 Ii.nds Received 
 Paid Total Cost Margin of Rate of
 
by Makers by Farmers , Middle Man 
 Margin
 
M­
'hic'en
c 409 450 
 41 21 
 20 9.1
 
Wor Laying Hen 308 345 19 10.7
37 18 

Source: Agricultural Economics Research 
 itute
 
Notel Unit ic Won per 10 kg
 
The speci:l problem for this input involves the difficulty of obtaining
 
a4equvbte raw materials for processing of feeds because of poor market coordin­
ation.
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.System Modification
 
The concept of developing the delivery system for the total package of
 
complementary technical inputs does not appear to be fully exploited. A
 
combination of new seed varieties with the proper combination of fertilizers,
 
use of the proper combination of chemicals timed to be most effective, with
 
appropriate cultural practices related to the particular farm situation in
 
regard to soils, water and climate can offer substantial increases in pro­
ductivity in agriculture. With the possible exception of some contract
 
arrangements, and some special programs with pesticides, there appears to
 
be little effort to combine the delivery of the technical inputs with techni­
cal knowledge related to their use. In particular, delivery of fertilizers
 
and other agricultural chemicals through NACF apparently is viewed oniy as
 
an activity of physical distribution, independent of information about tech­
nical use of the inputs or potential markets for alternative commodities.
 
It is recommended that NACF and ORD jointly develop a program to de­
liver to farmers the total complementary package of technology best designed 
to stimulate optimum farm productivity adapted to the conditions of each 
agricultural area. The joint program would include the following elements: 
1. Adequate supplies of each of the appropriate technical inputs-­
seeds, fertilizer, chemicals, etc.--available for farmers to purchase
 
in order to put together the optimum technical package for his farm,
 
2. Technical services and advice on uses of the technical inputs,
 
related cultural practices, farm management and outlook information
 
concernaing potential markets and expected prices availqble as part of
 
the inputs purchase transaction. Technical services might include
 
soil testing. The important point is that technical services and
 
advice would be available to the farmer at thp timp ha in mn.&...
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critical decisions. The technical inputs and technical knowledge
 
would be delivered as a package.
 
3. Opportunity for the farmer to purchase the inputs on credit covering
 
a very high percentage of their costs. 
 The credit procedure should be
 
a very simple transaction, available with the inputs and advice without
 
need for separate trips and transactions by the farmer. Consideration
 
should be given to offering supplementary production credit as part of
 
the same transaction.
 
This proposal has several implications for NACF and ORD. ORD would con­
centrate extension resources on training and informing NACF personnel who
 
work directly with farmers, in order that they be capable of delivering high
 
quality technical advice. 
NACF would receive direct payment for performing
 
the advisory service. 
NACF would simplify loa, procedures for technical in­
puts and shift a larger portion of its credit to the direct financing of
 
technical inputs. Currently only about 40 percent of the inputs sold by
 
NACF are on credit, and NACF provides only about one-fourth of the total
 
production credit used by Korean farmers.
 
Itwould appear much more important for NACF to finance a very high
 
percentage of farmers' necessary inputs at reasonable interest rates than
 
to ILnance the inputs at low interest rates.
 
The recommendation to expand and integrate the technical farm input
 
supply system assumes administrative procedures can be implemented to
 
achieve high performance from the organization providing the services. The
 
economic advantages of a highly rationalized supply system are significant
 
but they can easily be dissipated if the organization is not responsive to
 
the real needs of farmers. 
 Itwould appear desirable to introduce three
 
institutional devices to encourage improved performance by the organizationt
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1. Some type of incentive payment structure, related to performance,
 
for managers,
 
2. Performance auditing procedure, and
 
3. A procedure for farmers to effectively make their voices heard in
 
expressing dissatisfaction with the services rendered by the organization.
 
Chapter 5
 
ECTED MRKETING FUNCTIONS
 
Assembly
 
The assembly function in Korean agriculture is dominated by the very
 
small quantities of products marketed by individual farmers; this requires
 
many separate transactions and increases the coordination problem. 
A
 
farmer with a very small quantity of a product to sell cannot afford to in­
vest much in acquiring information about market opportunities. While there
 
are large numbers involved in performing assembly functions, there is little
 
evidence to indicate the effectiveness of competition and market informa­
tion at the village level. However, since there appears to be few barriers
 
to entr), one would not expect significant monopoly profits from assembly
 
and, because of the small quantities of most products marketed from a vil­
lage, large numbers of competitors would be associated with unnecessary
 
costs. A possible barrier to entry is the tie between credit and product
 
marketing. 
To the extent farmers depend upon the assembly operators for
 
production credit and to make the marketing of commodities a condition
 
of a loan, the lack of financial resources becomes a barrier to entry and
 
offers potential for monopoly profit. 
Thus, the availability of conven­
ient and reasonable credit, independent of tie-in conditions, may be a
 
factor in assembly costs, though a large number of combined loan and pur­
chase agreements do not necessarily indicate existence of monopoly and
 
poor performance. Neither marketing charges nor interest rates 
can be de­
termined independently in such arrangements. 
 The assembly operator may
 
use either prices or interest as a competitive practice. Given the high
 
interest rates, the possible losses from bad debts, and the probability of
 
Competition developing iL response to high profits, it may be that the
 
credit-purchase arrangement is not a source of monopoly profit. 
The major
 
factor in crcdit availability for farmers is not that they use it, )ut that
 
it provide an easy alternative in bargainir- 4ith the assembly operator.
 
Perhaps more significant is the fact that the traditional small-scale
 
assembly operator is usually a passive actor in the marketing system, ac­
cepting what is available for sale and not giving effective information
 
about potential market and production opportunities to the farmers in his
 
assembly area. 
Or, changes in the market prices may not be effectively
 
transmitted to farmers, because of the tie-in arrangements.
 
The assembly of rice is much less likely to be a problem than are
 
minor and developing commodities. A traditional village produces enough
 
rice to get reasonable economies of scale in assembly. 
However, the pay­
off in reduced marketing costs from 
achieving geographic concentration
 
and specialization in production of specialty crops, may be significant
 
and will become much more important as the economy develops.
 
One of the reasons the cooperative system has not been competitive
 
in product marketing is that coops have not been active in first-stage
 
assembly. 
The farmer must deliver his product to the cooperative which,
 
in the case of the viable coops, is usually a considerable distance from
 
the farm, considering the limited transportation available to most farmers.
 
The service he receives may not be custemer-oriented. Nor are the farmers'
 
terms of sale certain when the product leaves the farm, as 
are terms with
 
the traditional assembly operator. 
Thus, the traditional assembly operator
 
provides a Hdgnificantly different service. The practices of the coopera­
tives may have to be modified to provide effective competition and a viable
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alternative in the assembly function.
 
Transportation
 
Transportation becomes much more important as the economy develops.
 
Demand for transportation can be expected to exceed the increase in total
 
food marketing because of the expected shifts in diets away from grains to
 
more perishable and bulky products. Also, as volumes of products and
 
wage rates increase, truck transportation can be expected to replace more
 
traditional transport methods from the village to the local assembly markets.
 
Increased production of perishable products also will put higher value on
 
the quickness and reliability of transportation. This will require, in turn,
 
improvement of roads into the villages.! /
 
As truck transport becomes much more important, so will the potential
 
benefits of an effective market in trucking services which operates with
 
a system of information and brokerage for trucking services to assemble
 
full loads and reduce empty back hauls.
 
Figure V-1 shows the distance (in km) between the 5 major cities,
 
each of which has a major central wholesale market.
 
Processing
 
Future demand for food processing in Korea isi difficult to assess.
 
The consumer seems to have a strong preference for fresh products and
 
home-processed kimchi. Existing storage techniques seem to be effective
 
in preserving the less perishable fruits and vegetables through the winter
 
months. The development of the plastic green house allows production of
 
11/The AERI study of livestock marketing indicated tLat only about 6 per­
cent of the local hog assembly operators used trucks, while 66 percent

used bicycles and 24 percent used carts to get hogs to the local assembly

markets. Most cattle were walked to the local market which averaged 7.4
 
kilometers from the village.
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Seoul 
 166.4 km Daej on
 
Figure V-i: Transportation Distances 
to Major Cities
 
winter and early spring vegetables and provides employment for abundant
 
farm labor, as a complementary rather than a competitive farm enterprise. 
Given relatively high processing costs, costs of processed fruits and.
 
vegetables and meats will remain high in relation to 
incomes. These com­
bined factors ca, severely limit the domestic demand for food processing
 
services weal into the 
1980s.
 
Data from a recent loan proposal show possible increases in demand
 
k.;' everal commodities. The proposal is 
to increase production above 1969
 
levels as follows: silk cocoons 3.1 percent; gIrapes 79.0 percent; peaches
 
29.? percent; appies 3.6 percent; pears 18.6 percent; and mushrooms 83 per­
cent, The anticipated proportion of these products to be processed is
 
projected as: milk cocoons 
100 percent; grapes 50 percent; peaches 30
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percent; apples 5-10 percen; pears 10-15 percent; and mushroomn 100 per­
cent. These increases should not be expected to strain the capacity of
 
existing processing facilities, with the exception of the proposed high in­
crease for mushrooms.
 
There are exceptions involving s~ignificant potential expansion of demand
 
for processing services and facilities. Urbanization, housing arrangements,
 
and employment opportunities for women may create a significant demand for
 
commercially prepared kimchi. Demand for wheat flour is likely to expand,
 
especially if price and import policies keep the piice of wheat relatively
 
low compared to rice. A substantial potential seems to exist for low-cost
 
products from soybeans which would serve the role of meat and milk in diets
 
at lower costs.
 
Potential exists for processing some products for export. Mushrooms
 
are the leading prospect. Plans exist to develop a frozen strawberry in­
dustry for export. The development of an export market for a product can
 
be expected to result also in the expanded domestic use of that commodity
 
through economies of scale in processing, and developing a reliable and
 
lower cost supply of raw materials. The potential complementary produc­
tion for the export and domestic markets needs to be considered in planning
 
for export development.
 
ProcessIng facilities for meat, fruits, and vegetables currently appear
 
to be far in excess of current use, as shown in Tables V-1 and V-2.
 
Capacity data may be somewhat misleading as an indication of possible
 
investment needs. For example, the increased total milling for projected
 
demands, based on increased populatlon, for rice and barley to 1985 are
 
small, probably less than 28 percent. However, the milling capacity may be
 
of an uneconomic scale and technology given the projected chan;e in market
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quantities. Modern facilities can reduce the losses in milling. Small­
scale local mills were most economical when a large portion of the grain
 
went from the farmer to mill and back to farmer, but with more grain mar­
keted, it will be economical to concentrate much larger units of grain for
 
milling. Similarly much of the capacity in livestock claughterlng facili­
ties exists as small plants; it may be economically desirable to replace
 
them with modern plants as demand expands and barriers to central markets
 
and facilities are eliminated.
 
Table V-l: Processing Facilities for Meat, 1970
 
No. of Plant 
25 
Capacity (A) 
(MT) 
20811.5 
Production (B) 
(Mr) 
2530 
B/A 
12.1 
Source: MAF 
Table V-2: Processing Facilities for Fruits and Vegetables
 
No. of Capacity Production B7
 
Item Plant (A) (B) B/A
 
(MT) (MT) ()
 
Canned products 138 437,294,052 30,522,161 7.0
 
Wine 15 21,519,024 12,542,396 58.3
 
Pickles 14 23,813,400 1,495,300 6.3
 
Pickled radish 54 32,705,532 2,812,760 8.6
 
Others 20 36,736,512 6,907,326 19.1
 
Source: MAP
 
Note: Unit for canned product is can of 4 hop. Unit for wine is bottle of
 
3 hop. Unit for pickles, pickles radish and others is kg.
 
Barriers to effective performance in processing include underdeveloped ar
 
expensive food technology, a high cost, unreliable product-supply system, and
 
relatively expensive wholesale-retail product marketing. Reducing these
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barriers could result in lower prices and an expanded demand for processing 
services. 
Storage and Losses
 
Performance of the storage function has two important aspects, coordin­
ation and allocation of stocks through time, efficiency and effectiveness of
 
the physical handling and maintenance of produced quality. Pricing aspects of
 
grain storage related to the grain management program were discussed in
 
Chapter 3.
 
It appears that warehouse capacity for grain is adequate in terms of
 
total available space, but questions arise concerning the quality of facili­
ties and management practices. A 1968 review of Korean grain storage by
 
Kansas State University Department of Grain Science and Industry estimated
 
losses of rice in farm and market channel storage and handling equal to
 
about 17 percent of production. Farmers reported losses of 13 percent for
 
storage on the farm and market channel losses were estimated at 10 percent.
 
The last figure is consistent with loss of 10.3 percent reported for govern­
ment-controlled rice in 1966, broken down as follows: unexplained disap­
pearance 3.4 percent; spoilage 2.8 percent; ground storage loss 2.2 percent;
 
theft 1.3 percent; and fire .6 percent. Improved storage facilities could
 
reduce these losses, but the savings are limited. A pre-feasibility study
 
indicates savings from improved storage facilities and practices equal to
 
3 percent of the quantity stored, and savings from new warehouse facilities
 
alone at between one-half and 1 percent, assuming spoilage of about 3 per­
cent during storage.
 
Tables V-3 and V-4 give estimates of losses of rice by grade of warehouse
 
and type of on-farm storage container as reported in 1969.
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Table V-3: 
 Rate of Loss of Rice by Type of Warehouse
 
Condition Frst 
Class 
Second 
Class 
Quality 
Third 
Class 
_-
Under Low 
TemperaturL 
Unhulled rice 
(z) 
0.54 
() 
2.10 
() 
3.71 
() 
0.08 
Not further 
prepared rice 1.71 3.50 3.92 0.05 
Polished rice 1.63 3.91 3.96 0.28 
Average 1.29 3.17 3.86 0.14 
Source: Institute of Agricultural Industry Economy
 
Table V-4: Estimated Storage of Marketed Grain by Grade of Warehouse
 
Warehouse 
 Rate of Storage ! 	 Average Amounts of Grain
 
Storage During a 
Year
 
() 
 (1000 MT)
 
Low-temperature
 
warehouse 
 1 
 15
 
Firrt Class 
 13 
 190
 
Second Class 
 43 
 630
 
Third Class 
 43 
 630
 
Total 
 100 
 1,465
 
Table V-5 shows the inventory of grain warehouse units as 
of the end of
 
1970. 
 No data are available on the percentage of utilization of total ware­
house capacity. However, the latest data report 95 percent of NACF ware­
housing capacity was used inAugust, the period of barley harvest and peak
 
use in 1971.
 
Losees In storage are difficult to estimate. For example, some reduc­
tion in weight results from drying of grain but does not represent a real loss.
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NACF has estimated wastage rates for a number of commodities in storage in
 
The estimates
specialized storage facilities within the marketing channel. 

rice, 2.25 percent; barley, 2.0 percent; soybean, 1.0 percent; sweet
were: 

potato, 5.81 percent; white potato, 8.3 percent; apple, 6.0 percent; pear,
 
7.5 percent; tomato, 12.5 percent; radish, 6.3 percent; chinese cabbage, 6.3
 
percent; cucumber, 3.3 percent; red pepper, 7.5 percent; garlic, 12.5 per­
cent; onion, 7.5 percent; sesame, 2.25 percent; beef, 1.25 percent; pork,
 
1.0 percent (Source: NACF). 
Table V-5: Grain Warehouses at End of 1970 
Ownership Number Space Capacity 
(pyong) (MT) 
Government 
warehouses 15 1o700 124,500 
Agri-coop 
warehouses 20832 159,368 510,185 
Korean Express 
warehouses 566 69,794 243,666 
Others 10072 76,732 255,004 
Total 4,485 322,894 1,133,355 
The need for NACF and government storage capacity relates to seasonal
 
price patterns and the incentive for private storage by farmer, traders,
 
retailers, and consumers. Any increase in NACF or government storage
 
facilities should follow a comprehensive review of the total storage system,
 
including policies and regulations effecting th, utilization of existing
 
capacities, and the management practices in utiLization.
 
Wholesaling and Retailing
 
Each of the five major cities has a central wholesale center, legally
 
The law was designed to establish
instituted under the Central Wholesale Law. 
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effective central markets, and specifies that transactions at the wholesa.e
 
level are to take place in these markets (an exception is markets operated
 
under the Law for Cooperatives). The law apparently was intended to encourage
 
scale in wholesaling since it limits purchases to designated wholesalers. Ii,
 
practice, most transactions take place outside of the central wholesa.ic 
 or
 
NACF markets, but the central markets probably contribute to coordination by
 
providing a central place for trading witb easily available price information
 
for thosa operating outside the market. 
It is, of course, not necessary to
 
trade all commodities in a central place in order to achieve efficient pricing.
 
The wholesale market facilities of Seoul suffer from a v:ery rapid growth
 
in population, congestion, and inefficient facilities for handing large quan­
tities of food. Since it Is physically impossible for the Seoul central
 
wholesale market to handle the required volume, the law requiring its 
use
 
is seldom enforced. Given the si;.e of Seoul and its projected growth, tne
 
decentralization of some of the wholesaling appears desirable to reduce
 
costs of physical distribution. At the same time government participation
 
in providing institutional structure for an organized market place Js highly
 
desirable.
 
Wholesalers are generally small-scale operators, althuugh there are a
 
few fairly large grain wholesalers. They appoier ,-,bte highly competitive,
 
and face few barriers to entry other thirn the, unenforce-1 ueatral Wholesales 
Law. It is probable, despite any hard Pvidence either way, that the whole­
salers are not making monopoly profit, though they may gain some. special
 
return from superior market knowledge.! / Howev3r, the very large numbers 
, 
1/ There may be some exceptlons, since there is some evidence that larger
retailers are able to obtain some products, especially processed olles,
 
at significant savings by by-passing some wholesalers or making unsual
 
deals with wholesalers.
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of specialized wholesalers probably perform their functions at unnecessarily
 
high cost. Also, the wholesalers tend to be traditional in view, providing
 
what anount3 to a brokerage service. 
 They do not generally transmit coordin­
ating and technical information, other than the current price, back to assembl
 
operators or forward t:o 
retailers. 
Much of the discussion of commodities in­
volved the performance of wholesale market3 in directing commodities in time
 
and sr ,,.:e. 
Food retailing is dominated also by very small scale firms. 
 Retailers
 
tend to be specialized, with the largest volume handled by grain retailers.
 
A study of grain marketing by Professor Yong Kun Shim included a detailed
 
analys(i, of the operations of the operations of five stores in Suwon for the
 
year ending in October, 1967. This analysis indicated that typical 
-,raln
 
retailers 
were operating at an extremely low gross margin of 169 Won per
 
100 liters of grain sold. 
 This yielded a gross margin of about 15,000 Won
 
per month. After paying for utilities, transportation, and necessary addi­
tional supplies, very little was left as a return 
 to the operator. Even a
 
small error in measurement 
 would wipe cut all profits. And if rent and
 
interest on invettment were changed, returns 
 to labor would be negative.
 
The low returns are related to the very low 
 volume of output per worker, and
 
the labor-intens;ive, service 
 provided. Release of government rice through
 
government ntores and commissioned 
 retailers (who were compensated at 100 
Won per 100 liters) reduced the sales opportunities of private retailers 
still further In of grainthe months release. 
It Is no wonder that a high rate of business iallures exist among these 
small grain retailers. A survey a ofof sample permanent Seoul food retail 
stores, not including grain, showed the typical store was a very small oper­
ation. Of the stores, 68 percent hL4 less thin three ponk of store area; 
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67 percent operated without hired labor and only 5 percent had more than
 
one employee; 62 percent served less than 50 customers 
-per day; 42 percent 
had aales of less than 9,000 Won per day.
 
Data on costs and margins previously reported, and discussions with
 
retailers, indicate that gross margins for retailers handling other foods
 
are much higher than for grains. 
 Without detailed studies, the composition
 
of th-se gross margins remains a matter of speculation. However, given the
 
general lack of barriers to entry and intense competition, large profits 
are
 
unlikely.
 
The Korea Marketing Development Center has worked with two groups of
 
retailers to e tablish multi-line grocery stores, handling three or four
 
hundred items. 
 They do not handle grain because licenses to handle grain
 
are restricted to grain retailers. 
Emphasis is on processed foods, less per­
ishable fruits and vegetables, and meat. 
 They appear to offer most of these
 
products at significantly lower prices, about 10 percent below those of
 
traditional retailers. 
 The source of these savings was not completely anal­
yzed, but one store operator said he is able to purchase more directly in
 
larger quantities at significant savings. By handling 
 a much larger volume,
 
these stores probably can to stock a
afford variety of products with much 
more rapid turnover than a traditional retailer, thus reducing interest and 
inventory costs. Sales i.m?ker areper also much higher. Problems of the 
retailers includc difficulties and expenses of dealing with a large number
 
of suppliers, uncertain supplies and quality of products, and lack of credit
 
at cormercial bank rates. 
One of the retail groups unsuccessfully attempted establishto a cen­
tral purchasing organization. Obstacles apparently included problems in 
dealing with suppliers, in Inventory management, and in obtaining adequate
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The planned scale of operation was relativeLy smaii. now­working capital, 

ever, in the longer run with experiences in management, such a system could
 
reduce acquisition costs and improve coordination of supplies between con­
sumer and producers.
 
By generating larger volumes of sales and handling products which bene­
fit from cooling, these stores may be able to afford the investment in re­
frigeraLion by.spreading overhead costs, and reduce losses and preserve the
 
quality of fresh products.
 
Given the wage structure and employment opportunities of the current
 
economy, larger scale retailing is unlikely to replace traditional grain re­
tailers or many of the other small specialty retailers. Regulations and
 
other practices which restrict competitive development are barriers to im­
poved performance of the food system; restriction of licenses to specialized
 
retailers is an example. Regulations and taxes, which can be avoided by
 
small retailers, work to the disadvantage of the larger and more efficient
 
ones who cannot afford the risk of avoiding them. Regulations resulting in
 
black markets work to the disadvantage of larger scale retailers. And re­
tailers should not be discriminated against In allocating commercial credit.
 
Beside; the money costs of performing the retail function, other ques­
operatewholesale-retail organized 
labor in­
tions arisc. The system could be to 
and offer :Improved services using only a fraction of the present 
put; productivity per wG-'-er and incomnes per worker could be improved. The
 
can the economy be r:ganized to provide productive employ­questions are: 

for that fraction not providing productive servicef,? how can this
ment 

excress labcr he converted to needed capital equipment? assuming higher 
wage rates will cause the system to be altered, is this slow process con­
ducive to development and achievement of the performance objectives?
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In addition, large-scale retailing and associations of retailers could
 
contribute to improved coordination of the food system, by dealing more di­
rectly with producers and effectively informing producers of potential mar­
ket opportunities and consumers of advantageous supplies. Performance of
 
the total system could be improved.
 
As a final note on retailing, it is very difficult to see how a govern­
mental agency or any bureaucratic organization could profitably compete in
 
the current retail market. Retailing requires long and irregular hours, aggres­
sive attention to details, and a high degree of responsiveness to the prefer­
ences of consumers. Competitive retailing provides the incentives required,
 
while bureaucratic organizations usually provide no such incentives.
 
Coordination by Contractin?
 
The Korean agriculture system makes significant use of contracts to
 
coordinate supplies between farmers and exporters, processors, and the armed
 
forces. Each of these buyers needs reliable supplies of products with speci­
fied characteristics. 
 Table V-6 lists the products and agency involved as
 
contract buyers from farmers.
 
A fully developed contract system can create market and price certainty
 
for the farmer; accurately equate supply with demand; achieve greater effi­
ciencies in processing, farming, and assembly; and reduce transaction costs. 
Contracting which _,ffers special advantages to processors and exporters, 
also has a potential in fresh vegetable market If a buying organization can 
be developed. Contracts also can effectively transmit technical inputs and 
knowledge as part of the contract terms. 
Korea has had problems in developing the contract system, and the full 
advantage of contracting has not been exploited. Contracting apparently has 
worked best for coijnodltien lacking a domestic market. A major problem has
 
been failure to fulfill a contractual obligation when the market price de­
viates from the contracted price. In cases where a domestic market alterna­
tive exists, ccntracts could be based on a formula price tied to the market
 
price and specifying quantities to be accepted.
 
Table V-6: Contract Farming Items
 
Section 	 Items
 
Foreign Trade Dept., I) Perilla-fruitment semen 
National Agriculture 2) Perilla-fruitment leaf 
Cooperative Federation (NACF) 	 3) Burdock in Brine
 
Horticulture Div., 1) Flax, 2) Ramie, 3) Scallion 
NACF 4) Mat Rush, 5) Small eggplant 
6) Yellow Dentcorn, 7) Rape
 
Farm Guidance Div., 	 1) Beer BarleLy, 2) Castor 
NACF 	 3) Se,;ame
 
Army Sales Dept., 1) Chinese cabbage, 2) Cabbage 
NACF 3) Spinach, 4) Green onion 
5) Onion, 6) Radish, 7) Cucumber
 
8) Pumpkin, 9) Potato, 10) Red pepper 
11) Garlic, 12) Carrot
 
AFDC 	 Mushrooms 
Planning for strawberries 
Private 	 Sales to trmed forces of vegetables 
The Korean expertence in contracting geneira Iy has Involved NACF and 
the local cooperatwive as ti contractor wItan farmers. NACF in turn has 
contracts to supply th.v export market, proccossor and army. Vre final user 
could be more direct ly Involved In (heveloping the technicil package needed 
to supply the de sired pruuL t1Ct Under <-fflclent pioiiuctlon conditions. While 
NACP gives priority to contracting farmers In supplying imnputs and credit, 
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the concept of supplying the technical package as part of the contract does
 
not appear to be fully exploited.
 
High priority should be given to research designed to evaluate current 
and alternative conditions and practices In contracting. The situation in 
Korea, with highly li terate farmers, may respond to a sophisticated coordin­
ation system as an instrument of agricultural development in the newer and 
developing cummodities. Contracting does not seem an effective method of 
coordinating the grain system. Additional supplementary in:;t:itutions, such 
as effective unified cooperativt or other types of Inst-itutions such as com­
modity boards, may be necessary and desirable to extend the contracting sys­
tem. Because of the many varied possihil 11ties in ternms and practices in con­
tracting and the different requirements and potent tal It It:; of the various com­
modities, substantial research is vital to development of an effective system. 
Chapter 6
 
SUMHARY COMMENTS
 
The economic organization and coordination as well as physical distri­
bution of farm inputs and products will become increasing important in the
 
next decade, with transition of the Korean economy from traditional agricul­
ture to a scientific industrial one. This report has been an attempt to 
review the organization and make some comments on the apparent performance
 
of the existing system. 
Performance necessarily was perceived in a narrow context since consider­
ations in terms of the full range of appropriate performance goals, as dis­
cussed In the Introduct ion, would require a much more extensive analysis., A 
major recommendation is that resources for this type of research be allocated 
to government agecite, cooperatives, and universities. Korean development 
would return a IIlgh payoff for this type of research and related policy and 
extension efforts. 
Accurate and rellable statistical information is essential if the reality
 
of the marketing situation is to be known, and policies and programs effec­
tively evolated.
 
The Korean food distribution system is basically a low-cost one, pri­
marily because the dlet is dominated by grains which can be marketed inexpon­
sively, and because returns to labor In the system are extremely low. The 
apparent high costs In the dlistribution of grain if associated chiefly with 
storage cosi , which In turn are dcminated by very high tnt erest rates. A 
grain economy with annual harvens cannot avoid the cost of storage, although 
it may hide It or shift it. Grain cannct be stored profitably from November
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to September by a person paying 40 percent interest without a commensurate
 
increase in price. 
Highest priority should be giveJ to a review and modifica­
tion of the Grain Management Program which has undesirable economic conse­
quences, and with modt modification can become a significant factor in
 
stimulating grain production.
 
The consenuences of market regulations and 
 policies need to be carefully 
reviewed. Such structure market an sy3tem.rues the as incentive As the
 
economy develops, regulations which were appropriate to previous
a situation 
become obsolete and narriers to Improved performance, or may have unintended 
consequences. Some examples were noted In this rcview: 
1. Taxes on livestock as it T-')ves through tme Central Market and 
slaughter facil-ft es seem to create Incenztives to avoid the Central 
Market channel, resulting in losses in economies oi scale and quality, 
and reduced effectiveness of coordination.
 
2. Attempts to regulate grain Prices result in large quantities moving 
outside of established channels, Increasing the real costs of marketing. 
3. Tile pricing practice on grain in the credit program requiring re­
payment In kind. discourages the optm',m use of ;agrictultural Inputs. 
4. Pricing of good,, and services below market prices, such as certain 
types of agriculture credit, creates Incentives and opportunities for 
side payments thatt corrupt the system and reduce cred lbil1ty of the 
agency involved. 
5. The application of unrealis tic and unacceptable inspectIon-grading 
codes affects the marketing channels used and creates the potential for 
profitable side payments, IncreasIng marketing costs. 
These are examples of a clans of problems. 
Considerable economies exist in development of highly rationalized 
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distribution systems, especially for the crops other than grain. The problem 
is to develop them in such a way that they are structured with effective in­
centives for performance. The development of effective unified specialized 
cooperatives responsive to the needs of their members, contracting, and per­
haps new types of organIzationti such as properly instituted commodity boards, 
seem to offer potential for Improved market organization for, selected com­
modities. Improved coordination and increased labor productivity could re­
sult from larger scale operation. in the private market channel. Viable 
cooperativet In assembly and wholesaling operations, by offering effectiv'e 
alternatives, could provide di(scipline to the private syStem. It is extremely 
unlikely that cooperatives could compete in food retailing within the Korean 
situation.
 
Technical inputs can be expected to become much more important in the 
future. It is important to develop more effective methods of delivering 
tht! total technical package, including technical knowledge and Information 
about market potentials and, if possible, reliable markets at ptedictable 
prices to farmers. The cooperative system has a unique opportunity to im­
prove performance in this area. Similarly, the development of contracting 
systems Is vry promising. 
The demand for food marketing services in the aggregate will expand 
between two and four times by 1985. As wage rates increase and consumption 
patterns shift from grains, costs of food marketing will. increase Szeatly, 
unless offset by increased productivity and other improvements in the organi­
zation of thb, food systems. Now facilities will need to be built. Many of 
the urban fa'lltie, currently In use are already obsolete and otherwise 
inadequate. 'lannlng for new facilities needs to he oriented to the food 
system which will develop in the future. It is hoped that this report will 
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be of value in research and planning which will contribute to the develop­
ment of a high performance food system in the future.
 
APPENDIX
 
Typical Marketing Channel Maps, Cost and
 
Pricing Information on Selected
 
Agricultural Products and Foods 
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Table A-I: 	 Marketing Coas and Margins by Function (from Suwce.w to Seoul) 
for Korean C'itle, November 1968 
-Total 
 Margins 
Selling Marketing Net 
Division Price Costs, Margins Sub-Total 
Farmersi 97,000 530 - 530
 
Quasi-Wholesaler 104,000 2,120 4,880 7,000
 
Retailer 123,872 8,000 11,872 19,872
 
Total - 10,650 16,752 27,402
 
Source: The Report of Beef Marketing Margins by NACF
 
Note: Unit is Won per head (394 kg).
 
Table A-2: 	 Seasonal Price Variation in Korean Cattle for Farmers 
Month Rate of 
Year 1 3-4 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 iI 12 Fluctua­
_tion
 
1966 89.6 94.0 96.3 101.1 104.6 107.3 100.1 100.3 102.7 103.6 A01.5 96.4 17.7 
1967 7b.7 84.2 91.0 100.0 109.8 105.8 101.7 102.3 104.2 106.4 108.2 106.8 31.1 
1968 86.2 91.8 95.3 98.5 106.2 103.9 C',.4 104.0 102 71102.0 103.0 101.9 20.0 
1969 93.7 98.() 104.4 102.6 1')(). 99. 3 9.5101.7 103.2 100.6 103.2 3 100.2 96.9 
1970 87.3 90. 95.7 1.00. ' 102.8 102.5 101.7 102.3 104.2 104.8 104.2 .103.2 17.5 
Ave. 87.1 91.71(,,../100.5 10').3 104.4 101.7 102.4 102.8 103.3 103, 101.0 18.2 
Source: Research 1)epartm ant , NA('[ 
Special Markt. in ro,.ul 	 at ion 
1. The govert- rnt promulgated the implementation decree of the livestock 
industry law D)ecomber 16, 1963. One section of the law prohibits butchering 
of Korean cows )c"low the age of five aud bulls below the age of two. 
2. Toe retail price of beef hat been settled at a negotiated level. 
3. The producer-farmerH usually visit the Cattle markets once or twice 
a year. Then, they obtain market information there from the livestock 
dealers and naighbourhood, 
"90U"
 
Table A-3: Retail Price Differences by Cities of Koreak tk'e, 
 I70
 
- "-r on th 
City T1 3 4 
_ --
 - - Ave. 
Seoul 400 444 14,0 450 1458 5o0 500 V) 500 500 0,,0. 4,5 
Pusan 462 470 428 412 42 402 5 . 48h 4(82 
,Taegu 410 
420 440 450 432 420 454 4 0 '.3 480 504. )10 457 
Kwang-Joo 320 32( 322 1342 37 
352 66 0') '00 ! "100 
Taejon 400 
 400 400 400 4 450 4 45()0 450 4',(I 42404 0q q0 Q4 ) 2 
iAve. 399 1411 
 408 415 4l I42/ . j 4 77 47'; !101 4 
Source: NACF 
..... 
 .
 
Note: Unit is Won per Gitn k600g)
 
Table A-4: Marketing Costs and Margins per Pig by >krchatwc (frin Ko-
Myung to Seo.l), .1969 
Total Mar1i in.Division 
 Selli1g Marketing Net Total Rate 
Price Costs MarIns 
Producers 
 12,432 

- L 
Collecting broker 
 13,350 200 
 718 918 17.2
 
Shipper 16,536 1,718 1,288 3,006 56.2
 
Central Wholesale market 

-

-
- (1,511) 28.3
 
Retailer 
 17,780 853 
 571 1,424 26.6
 
Total 

- 2,771 2,577 5,348 i100.0
 
Source: The Agricultural Economics Research Institute
 
Note: Unit is Won per head (90 kg)
 
Table A-5: Valiation Index of Pig Price by Month
 
Month-Rate of
'ear 1 2 3 41 5 6 7 8 9 10 Il 12 Fluctu­
____ 
_____atI ion 
966 106.3 104.5 102.8 103.1 99.1 98.2 95.9 93.2 95.7 101.9 100.4
 
967 75.1 76.9 82.6 91.6 99,6 98.2 
101.6 102.1 1,11.3 116.8 P1.8 12. 
 47.3
.1968 93.1 9,.8 101.6 105.7 106.3 1(6.0 

-04.0 100.7 100.2 96.6 95.2 93.3 3.21969 106.5 104.3 1(3.4 99.9 81.5 78.9 
 91.9 100.1 107.1 110.4 110.1 10h,4
1970 86.6 87.4 91.6 
 96.6 96.9 98.4 
 99.9 101.3 107.1 109.4 110.h 1.14,0 24.2
Ave. 95 5.5 94. 9 6 .4 4 ,, 96.7 95.9 98.8 99.5 104.3 .07.0 107.7 107.4 ;2
Source: Research )opartOwn t, NACF

Note: This data Is made: of farmers' selling price per head (75 kg).
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Figure A-2: Marketing Channels of P'Ig and Pork 
Source: The Agricultural

Economics Research Institute, 
1970 
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Table A-6: Retail Price Differences cf Pork by Cities, 1970
 
Month
 
City 1 ~ 2 3T 4 5 6 7 81_ 9 1011 12 lAve. 
Seoul 200 218 220 220 225 250 250 250 250 250 250 276 238

Pusan 207 270 238 !230 1229 230 240 235 254 257 304 320 251
 
Taegu 220 220 1239 250 231 220 250 !250 255 280 312 320 254
 
KwaiLg-joo 192 192 1194 205 1193 I201 208 208 208 202
 
Taejon 200 1200 205 220 !220 220 230 1250 250 250 250 250 !229
Average 204 1220 219 225 1220 224 234 1239 244 249 265 275 235
 
Source: NACF
 
Note: Unit is Won per gun (600 g).
 
Table A-7: Marketing Costs and Margins for Eggs, 1968
 
Price Price L Total Margins
 
Peceived by Paid by Marketing Net
 
Producers Consumer Costs ' Margins Total
 
98 112 2.1 11.9 14.0
 
(15.0) (85.0) (100.0) 
Source: The Agricultural Economics Research Institute
 
Note: Unit is Wor per jal (10 eggs)
 
Table A-8: Index of Seasonal Wholesale Price Variations for Eggs
 
___________Month 
___Rate of 
Year 1 2 3 4 "5 6 7 8 9 10 11["12 Fluctu­
-- -. ....... . I , . . . a t i on


1966 94.5 90.1 85.7 86.8 91.2 96.7 100.0 94.8 120.9 113.7 10'.3 i03.3 35.2 
1967 99.0 91.9 80.8 84.8 94.9 98.0 100.G 100.0 1.17.2 121.2 106.1 1.00.0 40.4 
1968 102.0 105.9 89.1 91.1 97.0 98.0 94.1 99,0 112.9 115.8 101.0 90.0 26.7 
1969 86.7 84.6 87.5 85.6 88.5 94.2 95.2 99.0 119.2 123.1 120.2 117.3 38.5 
1970 94.6 100.0 103.1 100.8 128.9 1.28.9 100.8 97.7 105.4 105.4 96.9 92.3 36.6
 
Ave. 95.4 94.5 89.2 89.8 100.0 103.2 98.0 98.1 115.1 116.8 105.5 100.6 35.5
 
Source: Research Department, NACF
 
. Peddler 
Producers 
Collecting 
Broker Retailers Consumers 
Livesock-Sales 
Cooperative .U.N. 
.Figure A3:--MainL Marketing-Channels for Eggs 
to 
Forces 
Source: The Agricultural 
Economics Research Institute 
-94-

Table A-9: Wholesale Price Variations of Eggs by Cities, 1970
 
Month
 
City ". 1 2 3 4 5 68 9 10 -i 12 Ave. 
Seoul 129 136 120 124 136 129 125 122' 136 137 122 120 128
 
Pusan 116 1139 152 144 140 135 135 128 128 136 130 130 134
 
Tae-gu 125 1130 125 117 121 131 132 126 126 127 120 .120 125
 
Kwang-joo 123 120 129 125 125 131 130 129 146 147 136 120 130
 
Tae-jon 122 124 146 143 ,146 145 130 130 150 141. 123 110 134
 
Ave. 123 130 1134 131 i134 134 131 127 137 137 126 120 130
 
Source: NACF
 
Unit is Won per jal (10 eggs)
 
Table A-10: Marketing Costs and Margins for Chickens by Merchants (from
 
Yang Joo to Seoul), 1970 
Total Margins
 
Selling Marketing Net
 
Division Prices Costs Margins Tota:
 
Producers 208 - --
Peddler 228 8.40 11.60 20
 
Wholesaler or
 
Retailers 285 31.20 25.80 57'
 
Chicken Centers 450 88.20 76.80 165
 
Total 127.80 114.20 245
 
Source: Agricultural Economics Research Institute
 
Note: Unit is Won per kg
 
Table A-il: Seasonal Retail Price Variations for Chicken
 
Month_ 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 Ave. 
1967 - - - - - - - - - - -
1968 - - - 238 230 2117 221 234 223 215 218 200 222 
1969 166 179 7111 213 202 216 233 220 203 203 203 203 204 
1970 193 205 205 194 t89 203 179 218 223 229 218 1198 205 
Source: 1) Korean Poultry Journal (68.4, 1969.12)
 
2) Monthly Poultry Management (1970, 1-12)
 
Note: Unit is Won per kg.
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Figure A-4: 	 Marketing Channels of Domestic Fowl and Chicken from Yang-Joo to Seoul, 1970
 
Source: Research Department, NACF 	 Note: (1) = Live Chicken Channels
 
(2) = Dressed Chicken Channels
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Table A-12: Retail Price Differences for Chickens by Cities, 1971
 
Month
 
City 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Ave. 
Seoul 
- - - - 371 318 314 442 380 401 439 420 386 
Pusan - 389 385 366 302 30C 318 320 344 341 
Tae-gu - 350 360 323 300 300 328 359 362 334 
Kwang-joo 
- - - 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 
Tae-jon - 365 368 356 354 378 378 338 375 364 
Ave. 
- - - - 371 362 348 356 348 361 367 377 361 
Note: Chickens price is not a;ailable before May, 1971. Unit is Won per kg.
 
Table A-13: 	 Consumer Prices of Market Milk
 
Feb. 1967 June 1968 Jan. 1970 July 1971 
 Feb. 1972
 
11 	 14 16 
 18 	 25
 
Source: Seoul milk cooperative
 
Note: Unit is Won per bottle (250 g)
 
Table A-14: 	 Marketing Costs and Nargins by Function (from producers to
 
consumers), 1970
 
__________ Total Margins 
Selling Marketing NeLDivision 
 Prices Costs Margins Sub-Total Rate
 
Producers 	 50.00 1.93 
- 1.93 5.1 
Processing Plant 69.00 -	 19.00- 50.1 
Delivery Manager 77.50 
- 8.508.50 22.4
 
Delivery Man 86.00 0.71 8.50
7.79 22.4
 
Total 
- ­ - 37.93 100.0
 
Source: The Agricultural Economics Research institute (AERI)
 
Note: Unit is Won per kg.
 
Table A-15: 	 Cocoon Prices Received by Farmers
 
Years
 
Division 
 1965 196 19 1968 1969 1 
 0
 
Products in Spring
 
(4th degree) 1,223 1,468 1,519 1,613 1,680 1,748
 
Products in Fall
 
(4th degree) 1,140 1,255 1,389 1 6 
 1,566 1 1,620
 
Source: Monthly Review by NACF Note: 
 Unit is Won per 3.75 kg.
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Figure A-5: Marketing Channels for Marketilk-
Source : MAE, 1970 
I 
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Figure A-6: Marketing,Chanels,for Cocoons 
:,Source: NACF
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Figure .A-7: Channels of Tobacco Marketing
 
There is no data available on marketing costs and margin. 
Tobacco
 
is monopolized by government.
 
Table A-16: 
 Tobacco Price Variations
 
By Kind
Tobacco
Year Tobacco Cheongju Tobacco Hat-in­
- Flue Curing (Y.S.A.) (Sun Curing) Burley 'Air Cur n,_
 
1968 
 150.39 
 86.43 
 102.09
 
1969 
 165.43 
 95.07 
 112.30
 
1970 
 210.10 
 120.74 
 142.62
 
Source: MAF (ROK)

Note: 
 Above price iq putchasing price of government. Unit is Won per kg,
 
Producer Producer 
Broker Fisheries Coop 
Cuttlefish 
Export Coop 
F.C. Broker Proa'essors 
1/ 
-
Exporter / 
Consignee Proce,ssor Consignee 
Tboesle___ot~ Wholesaler Wholesalers 
Retailer 
Reailers 
Consumer Consumers 3 
Figure A-8: Market Channels for Figure A-9: Market Channels for
 
Dried Cuttlefish Fresh Cuttlefish
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Table A-17: Cuttlefish Marketing Margin
 
Classification
 
Sale Marketing Total
Item Merchants Price Margin Ratio Margin (40)
 
Fresh
 
Cuttlefish Producer 
 360 
- -
Freezing Processor 650 290 60.4 
Wholesaler 731 81 16.9
 
Retailer 640 
 109 22.7
 
Total 

- 480 100.0 57.2 
Dried
 
lf ish Producer 180 --

Shipper 380 
 200 76.9
 
Wholesaler 400 20 7.8
 
Retailer 440 
 40 15.3
 
Total 

- 260 100.0 59.1
 
.Note: 
Unit for fresh cuttlefish is Won per case of 40 cuttlefish; unit
 
for dried is Won per 20 cuttlefish.
 
Collectors
in .... g
Production Area Collectors
 
ProducerProcessors
 
Agri-coop
 
Figure A-10: Marketing Channel for Rape Seed
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Table A-18: Rape Seed Marketing Margin, September 8, 1968
 
Marketing Margin
 
Marketing
 
Channel Merchant Sales Cost Commission Total
 
Price Value Rate Value Rate Value Rate
 
Through 
Coop Producer 3,178 62 2.0 - - 62 2.0 
Coop 3,465 63 1.8 162 4.7 225 6.5 
Rape Oil 
Processor's Group 3,655 130 3.6 60 1.6 190 5.2 
Total - 255 7.0 222 6.1 477 13.1 
Through
 
----3,120 - -Merchant Producer 

306 8.9
Middleman 3,426 152 4.4 154 4.5 

Rape Oil 
249 6.8 - - 249 6.8Processor'F Group 3,675 

555
Total - 401 10.9 154 4.2 15.1 
Source: NACF, "Rape Marketing Research Report"
 
Note: Research Spot; Jeju Island, Pusan. Unit is Won per 60 kg
 
Table A-19: Farmer's Price Variaticns for Rape Seed
 
Year
 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Classification 1965 

60
Farmer's Price 52 62 50 58 54 

(52) (57) (43) (46) (40) (41)
 
Source: NACF
 
Note: Parentheses indicate fixed price of 1965, Unit is Won per kg.
 
Table A-.20: Index of Seasonal Farm Prices for Rape Seed
 
Varia-

Year Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep.. Oct. Nov. Dec. tions
 
Month 

I _Spread
 
1968 103.8 - 93.0 101.9 93.0 94.8 101.9 101.9 103.8 110.9 - 94.8 79.9 
1969 - 124.8 - - - 80.7 89.9 95.4 91.7 100.9 106.4 110.1 44.1 
1970 90.0 - - 88.3 90.0 95.0 113.3 108.3 108.3 108.3 25.0 
Ave. 101.9 114.6 111.6 117.0 119.1 82.3 88.4 94.7 99.5 101.3 99.2 99.6 36.8 
Source: NACF Note: Higher price season, Feb.-May; Lower price season, Jun.-Aug. 
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Figure A-11: 
 Marketing Channels for Straw-Goods
 
Source: NACF
 
Table A-21: Price of Straw-goods Purchased by Government
 
Items Year
Grade 1966 
 1967 1968 
 1969 iT70
 
Straw bags

for grain 
 1 37.70 40.30 50.00 
 62.30 70.70
 
2 33.20 35.50 45.00 
 56.60 69.00
 
Straw bags

for salt 
 1 24.00 25.60 29.00 
 33.20 40.60
 
2 21.60 23.00 26.00 
 29.80 36.50
 
Thick straw
 
rope 
 1. 44.30 47.80 
 52.00 59.60 
 81.30
 
2 39.90 42.50 
 46.00 52.70 
 73.20
 
Medium straw
 
rope 
 1 46.50 49.90 54.00 
 66.90 81.30
 
2 41.90 44.40 
 48.00 60.00 73.20
 
Source: NACF
 
Note: 
 Unit in straw bags is Won per bag; in straw rope,'Won per coil.
 
Problems
 
1. Straw goods prices aLc aunuuceo Dy tne Minister of Agriculture and
 
Forestry but sometimes these prices are not realistic.
 
2. 
MAF decides operation costs but these do not agree always with NACF
 
estimating costs, resulting in loss in sales for cooperatives.
 
Table A-22: 
 Bamboo Ware Frices Received by Farmers
 
_ 
 Year
 
Classification 
 1965 1966 i1967 1968 1969 

Prices Received by Farmers 
 950 1,000 1,150 1,200 
 1,383 1,704
 
Index 
 100.0 105.2 
 121.0 126.3 
 142.4 179.3
 
Note: Unit is Won per Suk
 
1970 
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Figure A-12: Marketing Channels for Domestic Bamboo
 
Note: Producer-Retail Merchant-Consumer is primary channel.
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Figure A-13: Marketing Channels for Imported Bamboo
 
Note: 	 Importer-Middleman-Retailer-Consumr pattern of channel is major

cours'e.
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Figure A-14: Domestic Marketing-Channelt; for Bambooware
 
Note: (1) and (2) 
are major channels.
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Figure A-15: Export Marketing Channels for Bambooware 
(2) and (3) are main channels. 
